Avoiding the Apocalypse

Robert S. McNamara

As we talk, the US has deployed 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads. Each, on average, has 20 times the destructive power of the Hiroshima bomb that killed 100,000 human beings. Of the 610001,200 are on hair-trigger alert to be launched on 15 minutes warning by the decision of one man, the President. Russia has similar plans and deployments.

Despite the end of the Cold War fifteen years ago, US nuclear weapon policies are today essentially what they were when I was Secretary of Defense 40 years ago. If I were to characterize US and NATO nuclear policies in one sentence, I would say they are: immoral; illegal; militarily unnecessary; very, very dangerous in terms of the risk of inadvertent or accidental launch; and destructive of the non-proliferation regime that has served us so well over the 40 years.

The objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, currently underway, should be to strengthen the Treaty and, in particular, to ensure that North Korea and Iran do not become nuclear powers. I believe there is a high probability that the Conference will fail to achieve those objectives. North Korea states it has produced a nuclear weapon and that it will continue to proceed on that path. Iran seems to be moving in the same direction. If both countries continue their present programs, other nations will follow. In Asia: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are likely to proceed; and in the Middle East: Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria may well follow.

Protecting the non-proliferation regime

As a first step, I urge that nations recognize that this problem should not be seen as a concern solely of the US. If proliferation proceeds, it will adversely affect the security of nations across the globe. Therefore it is an issue that should be dealt with by the United Nations Security Council. The Council should state it will ask the Secretary General to monitor proliferation and to report to the Council when he believes the risk is increasing. At such times, he should recommend the action required to reverse the trend.

As a second step, the Council should state that no nation not now possessing nuclear weapons will be allowed to acquire them. And it should then rule that nations now possessing the weapons will not be allowed to increase their forces.

The five Declared Nuclear Powers should be required to state:

1. They will follow a policy of No-First-Use.
2. They will reinstate and make explicit their Negative Security Assurance pledges, i.e. they will not initiate the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.
3. They will accelerate reductions in the level of their nuclear forces. Demands will be made that they adhere to Article 6 of the Treaty, which requires that they negotiate, in good faith, the elimination of nuclear weapons. Although this is a requirement of the Treaty (and in the US it is a law because the Treaty was ratified by the Senate) it is totally unrealistic to believe the Article will be implemented in the foreseeable future.
4. They will stop development of new nuclear weapons and will not initiate action to prepare for weapons testing. The Bush Administration has asked Congress to appropriate funds for these activities. The Undeclared Nuclear states (Israel, Pakistan, India, North Korea) will be asked to make similar pledges.

I do not believe there are acceptable military actions by which the US can respond to (continued on page 7)
Missile Defense, Weapons in Space, and Nuclear Proliferation

Richard F. Kaufman

The White House let it be known on May 18 that President Bush will soon issue a national security directive on the subject of weapons in space. The announcement and accompanying statements by Air Force officials, together with earlier developments, reveals much about the connection between missile defense and the militarization of space, and the possible consequences for nuclear proliferation.

New Bush Policy on Space Weapons

The president is expected to adopt a new policy incorporating the long-standing view of the Air Force and the present civilian leadership of the Pentagon who advocate US military superiority in space. This view, in its present form, goes back to the 2001 report of the commission headed by Donald Rumsfeld which recommended, among other things, that a) the US should move forward with a missile defense program, and b) the President should have the option of deploying weapons in space.

The decision to adopt a new space weapons policy appears to be, at least in part, a result of the difficulties being experienced with the missile defense program. Within the Missile Defense Agency, there have been delays in design and failure at several critical areas of technology from the land based missiles to, most importantly, the space-based laser. That weapon is common to both the missile defense program and the proposed weaponization of space. Meanwhile, the Air Force has been developing other space-based weapons such as the experimental satellite called the X3S-11, which was launched in April and is intended to disrupt other satellites.

The Rumsfeld report stated that an explicit policy is needed to direct capabilities for space “including weapons systems that operate in space.” How we would operate in space was hinted at a year ago when Pete Teets, the former acting Secretary of the Air Force told a symposium on space warfare, according to the NY Times, that “we haven’t reached the point of bombing and strafing from space. Nonetheless, we are thinking about the possibilities.” Defense Secretary Rumsfeld speaks about the need to defend our assets in space - meaning our communications satellites, space stations and other facilities. Gen. Lance Lord, head of the Air Force Space Command, puts it more sweepingly. “We must establish and maintain space superiority,” the General said in a recent congressional appearance. “That means freedom to attack as well as freedom from attack.” (To digress briefly, one can only wonder at this strange usage of the concept of freedom, usually reserved to describe values found in the constitution such as freedom of speech, and freedom of worship, or in the ideals expressed by Franklin Delano Roosevelt when he spoke of freedom from hunger and freedom from fear.)

Space offers attractive options not only for missile defense but for a broad range of interrelated civil and military missions.

-Paul Wolfowitz

The ABM treaty severely restricted ballistic missile defenses and prohibited putting components such as lasers in space. US withdrawal from the agreement eliminated those restrictions and laid the foundation for a new policy in which the deployment of weapons in space is linked with missile defense. Paul Wolfowitz, who was Rumsfeld’s former deputy, made the linkage explicit in an October 2002 statement in which he said: “Space offers attractive options not only for missile defense but for a broad range of interrelated civil and military missions.” Wolfowitz went on to say, “It truly is the ultimate high ground.” The Air Force declared in 2004 that its strategy is to dominate space. John Bolton, Assistant Secretary of State, left little doubt that this is also the administration’s view when he said: “We are not prepared to negotiate on the so-called arms race in outer space. We just don’t see that as a worthwhile enterprise.”

Missile Defense is Booged Down

The fact that the missile defense program is seriously bogged down has been clear for some time. Although there have been numerous and well publicized test failures - suggesting that deployment schedules would not be met, the more meaningful evidence of serious problems was reflected in the financial data. This seems counterintuitive because of the extraordinary sums that have been and are continuing to be spent. For example, the Administration plans to spend about $11 billion for missile defense in the coming year. This figure is high but taking inflation into account it is not substantially greater than what has been spent in recent years.

The EPS (ECAAR) study, The Full Costs of Ballistic Missile Defense, indicates the significance of the annual expenditures and the projected trends. The report estimates that the life cycle costs of all the systems that comprise the missile defense program will be as much as $12 billion. The estimated completion date for 3 of the 4 major systems planned - that is, the land-based, sea-based, and air-based systems - is 2015. (This assumes the space based laser, which is the most costly of the systems, will be built later.) To meet that target about half the full costs of the program, or about $500 billion would be incurred through 2015.

Under these reasonable assumptions the schedule for building what the Administration calls a layered program is a demanding one, and there must be a steep spending path to achieve it. We estimated when the report was issued 2 years ago that in order to meet the schedule annual spending for missile defense would have to reach about $25 billion by 2005 and $50 billion by 2007. In other words, the amounts being spent on missile defense are far below what would need to be spent to meet the Administration’s objectives for a layered missile defense.

(continued on page 7)
“US and NATO nuclear policies are: immoral; illegal; militarily unnecessary; very, very dangerous in terms of the risk of inadvertent or accidental launch; and destructive of the non-proliferation regime that has served us so well over the 40 years.”

Thus began former Secretary of Defense and EPS Trustee, Robert McNamara, in his address to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT) on May 24. Strong words. The treaty, originally signed in 1970, obligated non-nuclear possessing signatories not to develop nuclear capabilities. In exchange, the 5 declared nuclear countries (Britain, China, France, Russia and the US) pledged not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, and agreed to reduce their arsenals, eventually to nil. The non-nuclear countries also were promised access to nuclear energy technology. In the 35 years that the treaty has been in force, it has been remarkably effective.

With the success of the non-proliferation treaties, and since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, many activists have shifted their focus away from the nuclear realm to other threats. However, changes in world politics are threatening the balance the treaty has helped maintain. Several countries have developed, or are on the verge of developing weapons despite the treaty (Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran); the collapse of the Soviet Union left a lot of nuclear material unsecured in Central Asia which possibly could be acquired by terrorist organizations. With the expansion of possible nuclear states, and even scarier, of possible non-nuclear state actors, the possibility for human error, or even worse, human intention, multiplies.

In this issue of EPS Quarterly, we offer you several takes on the current state of arms races, the new WMDs, and the role of the UN in international peace.

We reproduce for you the entirety of Secretary McNamara’s address quoted above, and hope that you will marvel with us that someone who was at one time so close to the arms race can be such a clear and passionate abolitionist now. Mike Intriguator looks at the possibility of terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons, or other WMD, and proposes that since it’s difficult to control the supply side, we should develop a new form of deterrence on the demand side. We also have Richard Kaufman’s presentation on Ballistic Missile Defense, Space Weapons, and the NPT, walking us through the relationship between missiles, satellites and arms races. Additionally, I invite you to participate in our survey on citizens’ attitudes towards nuclear weapons; the questions are similar to those recently used in an AP poll, and it will be useful to see how EPS members stack up against the general public.

The NPT Review conference closed on May 27, without any substantial results. Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the UN summed up the conference with these words:

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, or NPT, has been a cornerstone of our global security. But today, the treaty faces a dual crisis of compliance and confidence. Delegates at the month-long conference, which is held once every five years, could not surpass the world to any solutions to the grave nuclear threats we face. The vast majority of countries that are parties to the treaty recognize its enduring benefits. But there are cracks in each of the treaty’s pillars - non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear technology - and each of these cracks requires urgent repair.

Our original name, Economists Against the Arms Race, expressly endorsed nonproliferation, and that purpose continues to guide the thinking and action of EPS. Our mission statement calls for us “to promote the movement for world disarmament, nuclear disarmament, and a reduction in the stockpiling of weapons by all countries,” and “to promote collective approaches to conflict and security problems,” including efforts through the UN and international treaties. I am deeply saddened, and frightened, by the current immoral and dangerous US policies, and the potential crumbling of the non-proliferation regime.

But I am heartened that people who are willing to speak against them, in the clearest and strongest language, and to offer sensible policy alternatives, are working with Economists for Peace and Security. And I take to heart the optimism inherent in Secretary-General Annan’s message: repair is still possible. I believe that EPS has a part to play in that repair - that our reasoned economic analysis of these terrifying issues shines a bright light on a dark global stage.

Thea Harvey
Executive Director

June 2005

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Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Michael D. Intriligator

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda spokesman Abu Gheit wrote: “We have not reached parity with them [the US, its allies and Israel] in terms of Muslims allegedly killed, wounded, or exiled. We have the right to kill 4 million Americans - 2 million of them children - and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple hundreds of thousands.” The only way that Al-Qaeda could attain this objective would be to use nuclear weapons or a highly destructive and sophisticated biological agent.

The threat of terrorist use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), whether biological, chemical, or radiological, is a real one that represents a most serious threat to the US and other nations that are potential targets of subnational terrorist groups or networks. If such a terrorist group could gain access to a WMD weapon, it could use it for at least threaten to do so. While there is very little information about terrorists’ capabilities or intentions to obtain nuclear weapons, Osama bin Laden has specifically referred to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by his terrorist network al-Qaeda as a “religious duty.” Documents were found in the al-Qaeda caves in Afghanistan that even included a schematic diagram of a nuclear weapon.

Megaterrorism

Garwin (2002) most fears what he calls “megaterrorism,” involving thousands of casualties, by means of biological warfare agents, smallpox, anthrax, etc. or nuclear weapons, possibly using a nuclear weapon stolen in Russia, or from the assembly in the United States of an improvised nuclear device based on high-enriched uranium. It is customary to include as WMD nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but there are important differences among these weapons. In fact, it is misleading or even mistaken to lump together all of these weapons as one category of “Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Nuclear weapons are in a class all to themselves in view of their tremendous destructive potential.

Trends in terrorist incidents indicate a tendency toward mass-casualty attacks for which WMD are well suited. There may even be rivalry between terrorist groups to have the largest impact and the greatest publicity. And recent revelations that Abdul Qadeer Khan, the “father” of the Pakistani nuclear weapon, provided nuclear weapons technology to several nations suggests the emergence of a type of nuclear weapons “bazaar” that will sell components, technology, etc. to the highest bidder, whether another nation such as Libya, North Korea, or Iran or to a well-financed terrorist group.

Terrorists could also employ “weapons of mass disruption:” spreading rumors to panic the population, destroying banking systems, disrupting the power grid, transportation and/or communication systems.

Evaluating the Threat

The world’s terrorist groups or networks have a wide range of motivations and ideologies, and their strategies and tactics likewise differ. There is no such thing as a “stereotypical terrorist.” To date, only one terrorist group has used WMD: the Aum Shinrikyo terrorist group release of sarin nerve gas on the Tokyo subway on March 20, 1995. But this attack represented the crossing of a threshold, demonstrating that certain types of WMD are within the reach of some terrorist groups.

To a degree, WMDs are “self protecting.” They are difficult to acquire, to use, and to care for properly. This has the effect of keeping such weapons out of the reach of various national and sub-national groups, including terrorists. A well-financed terrorist group, however, could hire experts, as was the case with Aum Shinrikyo. Ricin is easy to make, and nuclear weapons are not. Nevertheless, weapons are like many other technologies: demand is rising, and marginal costs are falling. Thus, it is only a matter of time before WMDs, including nuclear or radiological weapons, are no longer self-protecting.

The likelihood of terrorist groups acquiring WMDs is probably very low in the short run but high in the long run. There is no way to demonstrate either that terrorists will or will not use such weapons, but even the very low probability of a remote possibility is more than offset by the extraordinarily high loss it would entail.

Furthermore, it would be a serious mistake to underestimate terrorists’ abilities to acquire new technologies or to adapt or combine existing ones, as in the suicide hijackings of September 11, 2001. Such nightmare scenarios can make even thinking about the problem and its remedies extraordinarily difficult. Instead of waiting for a possibly devastating attack to occur and then responding, we should be actively seeking protective measures now.

Countering the Threat

1. Global response. International terrorism is a global problem must be dealt with on that scale, using international organizations and international cooperation. It cannot be addressed by unilateral action or with little support from other states.

2. Demand and supply. Terrorists’ demand for WMDs may increase regardless of defense policy, but the supply, particularly of fissile material, can be constrained. Russian stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons should be better safeguarded, and their chemical weapons and biological weapons destroyed, through an expansion of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. However, such constraints may not work perfectly, and terrorists may already have sufficient
fissile material to create a nuclear weapon or “dirty bomb.”

3. Nonproliferation. The fewer states that possess nuclear weapons, the fewer opportunities terrorists have to purchase or obtain fissile material or technology. The last few years, however, have seen North Korea building a small nuclear stockpile and Iran threatening to do the same. Presently, the NPT effectively allows countries to develop nuclear weapons and simply to withdraw from the treaty before deploying them. The EU, Russia, China and the US should work together during this year’s Review Conference to develop a more stringent regime. [Note: This article was written before the start of the 2005 NPT Review Conference. - ed.]

Because in the long run supply-side measures may be imperfect, we should therefore seek to reduce the terrorist demand for nuclear weapons. A new form of deterrence must be developed, with a global system that would be used against any terrorist group using WMD.

A New Form of Deterrence
Some (e.g. Konishi, 2002) have argued that the Bush administration’s preemptive/preventive war strategy may be the best way to deter terrorists, because it defines “a strategy that involves overwhelming military force aimed both at terrorists and states that harbor terrorists.” However, overwhelming US conventional power itself may compel terrorists “to use apocalyptic weapons in a struggle against the United States.”

There are clearly serious challenges to adapting existing deterrence models, which were originally designed for state-to-state interaction, to non-state actors, such as terrorist groups and networks.

Thus, traditional concepts of deterrence will have to be reshaped to deal with the issue of how terrorist groups could possibly be deterred. It is sometimes argued that suicide bombers cannot be deterred because they are already sacrificing their lives for their cause. This argument is flawed, however, as it is not the suicide bombers that must be deterred but rather their controllers, who make the decisions.

Terrorists do have something to lose and could thus potentially be deterred. The terrorists do, in particular, have a stake in overall group survival. In general, the possibility of deterring terrorism must be systematically analyzed, analogous to the process at the beginning of the Cold War, before the doctrine of mutual assured destruction was developed. The challenge to strategic analysts now is to develop a concept of deterrence that would be effective against terrorists, taking into account their particular motivations and strategies.

Conclusion
We must establish clear priorities for US counter-terrorism policies. The “Global War on Terror,” in my view, is empty rhetoric. It fails to recognize terror as a tactic that may be employed by different types of groups, including insurgents, to meet their political ends.

A coherent strategy should include serious improvements in intelligence systems that have failed us repeatedly; better organization, upgraded capacities, better use of the private sector (including universities), and holding intelligence services and individuals responsible for their failures. The recent bill reorganizing the intelligence system in the US has not accomplished these changes.

Some of the initiatives that have been undertaken at the local level, such as the Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) unit that was initially established in Los Angeles for information exchange and mutual support among first responders, should be expanded to the regional, state, national and international levels. Another initiative would be to provide more resources for diplomacy that has been starved for funds and personnel. A combination of strategic thinking, control of demand and supply, and international cooperation will provide the most effective (and most cost-effective) measures against terrorist use of WMD.

Notes

Dr. Michael D. Intriligator is Professor of Economics, Political Science, and Public Policy at the University of California, Los Angeles, and Vice Chair of EPS.

EPS at the UN

EPS’s mission states:
“We seek... to promote the movement for world disarmament, nuclear disarmament, and a reduction in the stockpiling of weapons by all countries; to support efforts to create economic incentives for peaceful relations; to promote collective approaches to conflict and security problems; to encourage the submission of international disputes to negotiation, arbitration, judicial settlement, [and] the United Nations.”

To achieve this mission, EPS actively participates in events, committees, and conferences at the UN. We are accredited with special consultative status to the Economic and Social Council and the Department of Public Information. In addition to economic and social issues, ECOSOC also studies cultures, education, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. The DPI facilitates information exchange between NGOs (non-governmental organizations).

The consultative relationship is reciprocal. EPS gains the privilege of participating in a wide variety of UN sponsored meetings and activities, and in return we help further the development aims of ECOSOC, the DPI, and the United Nations as a whole.

In addition, we participate in the following standing committees and bodies:
1. NGO Working Group on the Security Council;
2. International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA);
3. NGO Committees on Disarmament; Peace and Security; Human Rights; Sustainable Development; and Social Development;
5. The NGO Conference on Non-Governmental Organizations, or CONGO.
# Al-Qaeda's Nuclear Ambitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Date of Incident</th>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Date First Reported</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>On February 8, 2004, the Egyptian newspaper Al-Hayat reported that al-Qaeda had purchased tactical nuclear weapons from the Ukraine in 1998 and was &quot;storing them for possible use.&quot; Al-Qaeda allegedly purchased the bombs in Kandahar after a visit from Ukrainian scientists. The Ukrainian government denied that the transaction had taken place, stating that all nuclear weapons stored in the Ukraine had been transferred to Russia as of 1996.</td>
<td>Feb 8, 2004</td>
<td>Al-Hayat newspaper (Egypt)</td>
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<td>Sep 1, 2002</td>
<td>On January 23, 2005, German police announced the arrest of an Iraqi al-Qaeda member who had allegedly attempted to purchase uranium in Luxembourg. In September 2002, Ibrahim Muhammad K. attempted to purchase 48 grams (1.5 ounces) of uranium from an unnamed group in Luxembourg. Prosecutors claim that the amount of uranium was insufficient for the construction of a nuclear device.</td>
<td>Jan 25, 2005</td>
<td>German government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>British intelligence discovered documents in western Afghanistan which suggest that al-Qaeda members built a dirty bomb in Afghanistan. British officials also claim that the Taliban provided medical isotopes to al-Qaeda members to help construct the bomb. US officials cannot substantiate this claim.</td>
<td>Jan 30, 2003</td>
<td>British Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 2003</td>
<td>After the 2003 Casablanca bombings, a police roundup of Salafia Jihadiya exposed a plot by 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Laysh to attack a French nuclear power plant at Cap de la Hague. Additional evidence indicates that members of al-Qaeda trained Salafia Jihadiya for this mission.</td>
<td>Jun 7, 2003</td>
<td>Moroccan authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 1, 2003</td>
<td>On March 20, 2003, the FBI announced that they were searching for Adnan al-Shukrijuma in connection with the Jose Padilla case. Padilla was arrested in May 2002 for plotting to obtain materials in Canada for a dirty bomb. Shukrijuma was identified from documents obtained in connection with the 2002 arrest of Ramzi bin al-Shib, a key 9/11 architect.</td>
<td>Mar 1, 2003</td>
<td>US Government, FBI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Unspecified                | A publication posted by members of al-Qaeda on the internet included an article by 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Muqrin (Abu Hajir), a leading al-Qaeda fugitive in Saudi Arabia, which called for supporters to use nuclear and biological weapons in attacks against the Saudi government. | Jan 18, 2004 | Al-Qaeda manifesto, "The Base of the Vanguards."

| Unspecified                | In a secret interview with Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir, Ayman al-Zawahiri allegedly claimed that al-Qaeda possessed nuclear weapons purchased in Central Asia. Zawahiri reportedly told Mir that al-Qaeda sent representatives to "Moscow, Tashkent, [and] countries in Central Asia" in order to purchase "portable nuclear material." | Mar 3, 2004 | Hamid Mir |
| Unspecified                | According to the 9/11 Commission, al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan prior to the 9/11 attacks were considering ways of using "weapons of mass destruction," including mustard and cyanide, against Jews in Iran, "forcing Russian scientists to fire a nuclear-armed missile at the US," and using air conditioning systems in buildings to pump poisonous gas. | Jun 16, 2004 | US Government; 9/11 Commission |
| Aug 1, 2004                | Eight men were arrested in Britain and charged with conspiracy to murder after they were discovered with information on chemicals, explosives, and radiological materials. Also in their possession were plans of the New York Stock Exchange, the Citigroup Building in New York, the International Monetary Fund in Washington, and the Prudential Building in New Jersey. The arrests occurred two weeks after a series of 13 arrests of men allegedly affiliated with the al-Qaeda network. | Aug 2004 | British Government |
| Unspecified                | An al-Qaeda insider has alleged that Osama Bin Laden was pressured by network affiliates to purchase radiological material through contacts in Chechnya. The insider has been named as Abu Wael al-Warf. | Dec 19, 2004 | Al-Qaeda "insider"
| Unspecified                | Pakistani businessman Saifullah Paracha allegedly told al-Qaeda operatives that he knew where to obtain nuclear weapons that could be used against US troops. Paracha denied the allegations but admitted to meeting Osama Bin Laden in 1999 to discuss business deals. | Feb 11, 2005 | US Government |

Source: Excerpt from "Al-Qaeda's WMD Activities." Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Online at [http://css.miis.edu/psb/other/sjm_cbt.htm](http://css.miis.edu/psb/other/sjm_cbt.htm)
Avoiding the Apocalypse (continued from page 1)

North Korean and Iranian moves toward proliferation. Therefore the US and its allies in Asia and the Middle East, must address issues raised by North Korea and Iran through effective diplomacy. In particular, the US should agree to meet bilaterally with both North Korea and Iran. It should do so in the context of the multilateral negotiations involving the European 3 and the Asian 6.

Both North Korea and Iran clearly fear that the US wishes to achieve "Regime Change." In addition, North Korea has asked for commitments against aggression. The US should address these concerns head-on. It is inconsistent and ineffective to demand disarmament and pursue "Regime Change" simultaneously.

Iran has demanded recognition of its right under the Treaty to enrich uranium to fuel civilian reactors for the production of electric power. The US and the 3 European nations should assure Iran that they will supply the necessary fuel or will permit Iran to produce it under strict and continuous IAEA inspections.

If the Conference fails to achieve its objectives, as I predict it will, the Security Council should debate the issues I have referred to and take whatever action appears necessary to stop proliferation.

Messrs. Chirac, Schroeder and Blair, the political leaders of France, Germany, and Britain have stated publicly that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the greatest security problem facing the nations of the world in the twenty-first century. I strongly agree with them.

Robert S. McNamara is a Trustee of EPS. This article is the full text of Secretary McNamara's statement to the NPT Review Conference. On May 24th, Mr. McNamara spoke at a panel session co-sponsored by the Global Security Institute and EPS.

BMD, Space Weapons, & Nuclear Proliferation (continued from page 1)

Bush Administration Stays the Course

Now, this does not mean that the Administration or the Pentagon have given up on missile defense. The history of major weapons systems shows that they usually do not get terminated because of technical or cost problems. When the problems of developing a new weapon are seen as severe, the schedule tends to be stretched out. They are kept in the research and development phase, until they are deemed ready for deployment - and that can take years or decades. Missile defense, which goes back to President Reagan's Star War program and even earlier, is a prime example of this pattern.

Both BMD and Space Weapons May Increase Proliferation

To those who advocate them, missile defense and weapons in space are 2 sides of the same coin. One is intended to protect US interests and assets on earth, the other is intended to do the same in space. Each is seen as necessary to assure US military dominance. From this perspective, the fact that they are not cost effective, that they may not achieve their intended aims, and may jeopardize the interests they are supposed to serve, is not controlling.

The greatest danger is that these programs may exacerbate the difficulties of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is so for several reasons:

1. The missile defense program has not yet solved the problem of decoys and chaff - which are likely to be used by an aggressor to penetrate defenses. One possible solution is to arm the defensive missiles with nuclear devices which could explode close enough to an offensive missile to destroy it together with any chaff and decoys.

2. There are concerns that if, at some future time, it became possible to deploy an effective missile defense program, it would give the US a first strike capability; that is, the ability to launch nuclear weapons against any country without having to fear a second strike against the US by the other country. US missile defense is already causing other nations to increase their missile capabilities and their ability to penetrate US defenses. This action reaction dynamic may already be contributing to decisions by other nuclear and non-nuclear countries to consider increasing or establishing their own nuclear capabilities.

3. The US is developing more powerful missiles for the missile defense program, in particular for boost phase interceptors. These missiles can be used for offensive as well as defensive purposes, and they could be used by the US in its strategic offensive program. In addition, the US is offering to share missile defense technology with nations who agree to be missile defense partners. The shared technology could presumably include missiles which could possibly be incorporated or adapted in their nuclear arms programs.

4. The Full Costs of Missile Defense report states that the Bush Administration is exploring aggressively both the space-based kinetic systems such as what was formerly called "Brilliant Pebbles," and the space based laser. The reason, the report suggests, is the administration's desire to seize the initiative in space warfare, space countermeasure weapons, and military dominance of space that goes well beyond missile defense.

Conclusion

The proponents of placing weapons in space argue that space is just another environment for weapons and warfare, just as the land, the sea and the air have been.

Although an international treaty bans nuclear weapons in space, there should be little doubt that the proponents of space weaponization mean to include nuclear weapons in what is to them just another environment.

EPS Vice-Chair Richard Kaufman gave this statement during an EPS panel session on Missile Defense, Space and the NPT, held at the Iceland Mission to the UN during the Review Conference.
Nuclear Weapons Opinion Survey

EPS is undertaking an opinion survey of our members and constituents, so that we can better represent your position to policy makers. Please take a moment to answer these questions, and return the survey to our office (address below). Or use the online version at http://www.epsusa.org/nuclearopinion.htm. Thank you.

How likely is it that a terrorist attack using nuclear weapons will take place in the next five years?
- [ ] Very likely
- [ ] Somewhat likely
- [ ] Not too likely
- [ ] Not at all likely

How likely is it that one country will attack another country with nuclear weapons in the next five years?
- [ ] Very likely
- [ ] Somewhat likely
- [ ] Not too likely
- [ ] Not at all likely

Which statement comes closest to your view?
- [ ] No countries should be allowed to have nuclear weapons.
- [ ] Only the United States and its allies should be allowed to have nuclear weapons.
- [ ] Only countries that already have nuclear weapons should be allowed to have them.
- [ ] Any country that is able to develop nuclear weapons should be allowed to have them.

What do you think is the best way to halt nuclear proliferation?

- [ ] 
- [ ] 
- [ ] 
- [ ] 

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