Conflict or Co-existence

Gareth Evans

The world as we see it around us doesn’t immediately suggest that we have learned much about peaceful coexistence. Whether it’s Iraq or Israel-Palestine, Sri Lanka or Nepal, Darfur or the Eastern Congo, the Korean Peninsula or the Taiwan Strait, Colombia or the Caucasus, London or Bali, or wherever else in the world each day the golden media rule applies—“if it bleeds, it leads”—we are assailed with a constant flow of news about war, potential war or violent extremism which seems depressingly endless.

But what I want to suggest is that, for all that has gone wrong and continues to go wrong when it comes to war, civil war, mass violence and terrorism, conflict is not inevitable. We have learned a great deal about how to prevent and resolve it, particularly over the last decade; the record is rather better than it seems (at least in relation to war and civil war, if not terrorism) and we can do better still if governments and intergovernmental organizations apply the right kinds of policies and give the right kind of leadership.

The basic point about conflict and extremist violence is that it is always context specific. Big overarching theories about conflict—whether cast in terms of clash of civilizations, ancient tribal enmity, economic greed, economic grievance, or anything else—may be good for keynote speeches, and certainly good for royalties. They may also be quite helpful in identifying particular explanatory factors that should certainly be taken into account in trying to understand the dynamics of particular situations. But they never seem to work very well in sorting between those situations which are combustible and those which are not:

1) For every case of religious or ethnic or linguistic difference erupting in communal violence, there are innumerable more cases around the world of people and groups of different cultures and backgrounds living harmoniously side by side;

2) For every group economic grievance that erupts in catastrophic violence there are innumerable more that don’t;

3) For every instance of economic greed—control of resources or the levers of government—generating or fuelling outright conflict, there are innumerable more that don’t;

4) For every assertion of power or hegemony—internal, regional or global—that results in outright military aggression there are many more that don’t;

5) For every Muslim in the Arab-Islamic world whose feeling of grievance or humiliation against the US or the West takes a violent form, there are many millions more for whom it doesn’t; and

6) For every alienated second-generation immigrant, not succeeding in the new world but feeling adrift from the cultural moorings of his old, who translates that rage or despair into indiscriminate terrorist violence, there are innumerable more for whom that is inconceivable.

All this simply means that there are no single causal explanations, and no accompanying single big fixes, for any of the various continuing problems of conflict and violence that beset us. The problems are complex and multi-dimensional, and so too are the solutions.

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Is Terrorism the Third World War?

Philip Ball

The third World War has already started. It is not George Bush’s rhetorical “war on terror,” but terrorism itself. In other words, terrorism is the new war. Journalistic cliché? Apparently not. A recent analysis of the casualty statistics of global terrorism shows they follow the pattern previously observed for conventional conflicts ranging from small local skirmishes to the Second World War.

In at least two continuing conflicts not generally regarded as terrorist in nature - in Iraq and Colombia - the statistics are converging on the form seen for global terrorism, perhaps indicating that governments need to deal with wars differently. According to Neil Johnson, a physicist at Oxford University and one of the team that studied the figures, the findings raise the possibility that both conflicts “are a part of one big ongoing global war - a mother of all wars.”

If that is so, London is embroiled in it, too. The casualty figures for the July 7 bombings “absolutely fall in line” with what the analysis of terrorism statistics predict, says Johnson.

But how can a single, simple (if gruesome) statistic such as the number of people killed in attacks tell us anything meaningful about events and conflicts conducted in completely different places for what seem to be totally different reasons? Isn’t this like expecting to understand a country’s culture by counting its population?

That depends on what you are looking for. When he first studied the statistics of “deadly quarrels” eighty years ago, the British physicist Lewis Fry Richardson wanted to understand why wars happen. Richardson, a Quaker who served as an ambulance driver in the First World War, hoped that such insight could promote world peace. He decided first to find out how wars were distributed according to their size.

In the 1920s, Richardson plotted the fatality statistics for 82 wars fought since 1820 on a graph showing the size of the conflicts on one axis and the number of conflicts of that size on the other.

He found that the data fitted onto a smooth curve which, when the numbers were plotted as logarithms, became a straight line. This sort of mathematical relationship is known as a power law. The line slopes “downwards” because there are progressively fewer conflicts of ever-greater size: little wars are common, big ones rare.

The power law continued to hold as the data embraced conflicts such as the Second World War and Vietnam. Richardson’s discovery of power-law statistics of conflicts has been followed subsequently by the recognition that power laws govern all sorts of “social” statistics, from the sizes of towns to the fluctuations of economic markets and the network structure of the World Wide Web.

Power-law statistics of event sizes are also found for natural phenomena that occur close to points of instability, such as earthquakes and avalanches. This suggests that social systems prone to power-law statistics, such as economic markets and international relations, also operate on the brink of instability.

Earlier this year, computer scientists Aaron Clauset and Maxwell Young at the University of New Mexico showed that the fatalities from acts of terrorism since 1968 also follow a power law. “We were very surprised,” Clauset says. “It made us think that there may be some deep, underlying connection between terrorism and wars.”

But they found that not all terrorism is the same.

There are two different power laws - one that fits the figures for terrorist attacks in industrialized (G8) nations; and another for attacks in the rest of the world. The slope of the straight-line plot was steeper in the latter case, indicating that attacks in industrialized nations are more rare but more severe when they do occur. The attacks of September 11 indicate precisely that, as do the London bombings.

Johnson has teamed up with economist Mike Spagat at Royal Holloway College in London, a specialist in the Colombian conflict, and researchers in Bogotá, Colombia, to apply the same kind of analysis to this continuing struggle between the government and several left- and right-wing insurgent groups. The conflict has been going on since the 1980s, and at face value it resembles neither a terrorist-style confrontation nor a conventional war.

But the researchers found that the fatality statistics for individual attacks since 1989 also follow a power law. More strikingly still, the slope of the power law has been decreasing steadily over time and appears to be converging on precisely the value that Clauset and Young found for global (non-G8) terrorism. The Colombian “war” may have started out as something unique, but it seems now to have mutated into a conflict with the fingerprint of terrorism. And the team found the same trend for the statistics in Iraq since the coalition invasion in March 2003. Here, the slope of the power law initially had much the same value as that seen by Richardson for conventional wars. But it has crept up steadily since 2003, and now it, too, is equal to that for global terrorism.

Johnson argues that, while the conventional approach of political analysts is to look for micro-explanations of the cause of a conflict in terms of the motivations of the groups concerned, that statistical analysis suggests that the outcomes are much more to do with “the mechanics of how people now do war.”

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Letter from the Director

**Plus ça change?**

Throughout human history war hawks have argued that improved technology will make war safer, at least for "our" side. And men have insisted that, in this case only, war is the only answer to settle this problem (whatever this problem might be). Technology, strategy and politics have been interlinked since the discovery of the wheel gave Sumerian warriors the advantage of speed and maneuverability over their opponents.

So has anything really changed in the last 4000 years? In this issue of EPS Quarterly we take a look at modern conflict. Have new technologies really changed anything as is argued by those who wield them? Have changes in the geo-political situation changed the way strategies are planned or wars are fought?

President Bush claims that we have a unique new capacity to wage quick, decisive and clean wars. The argument seems to be that using new technologies, such as GPS-guided targeting systems, the risk and cost are so low that the old constrictions no longer apply. It is true that during the "active combat" phase of the war in Iraq, the casualty rate for Americans was very low. But the number of strikes was not. It looks like cheap and fast simply allows us to strike more often.

As Carl Conetta discusses in his article, "Is there a New Warfare," there is an additional danger in believing that new technology has changed the face of warfare. One can now make the argument that war is so cheap, fast and precise, so inconsequential, as to no longer need to be relegated to the realm of "last resort." This is indeed a change in thinking about how war is justified. Fortunately, I think that not very many people are buying it. Concurrent with developments in military technologies, developments in communications technologies keep the horrors of war present in enough minds; reminding those who care to pay attention that real lives are being destroyed.

Another school claiming that the nature of war is changing talks about a new generation of warfare. Since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), nation states have exercised a legal monopoly on the use of armed force. But that world is breaking down. We appear to be returning to the situation that characterizes most of human experience, where both states and non-states wage war. In so-called Fourth Generation warfare, at least one side is something other than a military force organized and operating under the control of a national government, and one that also transcends national boundaries. The era of tightly controlled and controllable war seems to have lasted only a few hundred years. But this "new" warfare, in which the enemy is often unseen, surprisingly conforms statistically with conventional wars. In his article, "Is Terrorism World War III," Philip Ball shows us that casualty and other conflict statistics are remarkably similar in this new generation.

However, something substantive has been changing in the last few years. Not fueled by new technologies or changes in war fighting strategies, but by building structures for international cooperation. As Gareth Evans shows in our leading article, "Conflict or Co-existence," the number and intensity of conflicts worldwide has gone down in the last decade. This came as a surprise to me when I first heard it a few months ago. Lack of war does not make the news. Especially when the world's only superpower is involved in a war, and when one lives in that country, the world doesn't look like a very peaceful place. And there is always news of conflicts that might break out any minute (North Korea, Iran, etc.), creating more fear and making it harder to believe in peace and security. But in fact, despite all that, the very structures that EPS was formed to support are working. Our mission statement calls for us to "to support efforts to create economic incentives for peaceful relations; to promote collective approaches to conflict and security problems; to encourage the submission of international disputes to negotiation, arbitration, judicial settlement, the United Nations or other multinational institutions for the settlement of controversies." It is immensely gratifying to have it borne out that the instincts of our founders were correct, and that the work which we are a part of is helping to create a more peaceful world.
Is There a New Warfare?

Carl Conetta

The hypothesis has two parts. One part impacts national security policy, and the other one is about how we should develop, organize and modernize armed forces.

On April 16, 2003, speaking at a Boeing plant in St. Louis, President Bush outlined the hypothesis with specific reference to the Iraq and Afghan war:

"We've applied the new powers of technology...to strike an enemy force with speed and incredible precision. By a combination of creative strategies and advanced technologies, we are redefining war on our terms. In this new era of warfare, we can target a regime, not a nation."

The President wasn't stumping for regime change when he said this, but advancing the idea that we have a unique new capacity to wage quick, decisive and clean wars. This hypothesis has been advanced in various forms over the past three years by Vice President Cheney, Richard Perle, Max Boot, Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld and many others.

The idea that we have a new capacity for low risk, low cost war gained broad currency during the conventional phase of the 2001 Afghan war. In many media portrayals, the war fulfilled a promise only partially glimpsed in the Kosovo conflict and first Gulf War. The media portrayed both the Afghan and new Iraq wars in this vein, using terms like "pinpoint," "precise," "a new style of warfare," and stating that wars would be fought while "sparing civilians, buildings and even the enemy." In short, the idea of a new, low cost warfare caught on.

Evaluating the hypothesis

Is this hypothesis true? Today, I will cast doubt on this hypothesis and talk about how the discourse on it relates to the current idea of military transformation.

But first I want to address another question. Why make such a big thing about newness of war? The goal is to overturn a long-standing presumption against war, the idea that war is a unique policy instrument not subject to utilitarian ideas - an instrument that should be a last terrible option, restricted to defense.

This presumption against war has been under assault since the Cold War. The three post Cold War administrations all adopted more activist military stances than the Reagan administration - though all differed on strategic rationale. The current administration has normalized the idea of maximum objectives in war - regime change - and adopted what it calls a preemptive stance. Some say it's actually a practice of preventive war, a more permissive stance. But I think the present doctrine actually goes further than this and can be called "preclusive," or "precautionary," war.

Inhibitions about going to war persist. Concerns about not just escalation and quagmire, but also about the inadvertent consequences of war and collateral effects remain. Collateral damage erodes the perceived legitimacy of a war and tarnishes the reputation of the prosecuting power, potentially weakening its alliances and standing in the world. Collateral damage complicates postwar stabilization, undermines efforts to win hearts and minds, and can spark revenge attacks.

These concerns weigh against war, and the new warfare hypothesis addresses them all to enable a more activist military policy, including regime change and precautionary war.

Afghanistan and Iraq: counting casualties

Do the Afghan and Iraq wars give us reason to rethink or roll back the presumption against war? Are the new wars fast, decisive, and clean? The new warfare hypothesis invites historical comparison.

I compare the two Gulf Wars. In the first Gulf War, 3,500 civilians and probably 20,000 Iraqi military personnel were killed. In the conventional phase of the 2003 war, there were 3,750 noncombatant deaths, give or take 15%. There were probably 9,200 Iraqi deaths among uniformed and irregular fighters.

On the coalition side, the first Gulf War claimed 358 lives, 245 of them in combat. In the conventional phase of the current Iraq War, 172 died from all causes, 136 of them in combat.

So overall, the civilian numbers are similar. In 2003, the number of combatants killed was down, about half of 1991 total on both sides, but because both sides had fewer troops engaged, the percentage of combatants killed was higher for both sides.

At face value, the numbers do not show a revolution in the cleanliness of war. It should be said, however, that since this war was for regime change, we might expect more dead. Indeed, the war did involve more ground combat than the first Gulf War. Desert Storm in 1991 saw less than 150 equivalent brigade days of ground combat. The equivalent brigade days of combat in the 2003 conventional war were between 400 and 450 - three times as much ground fighting.
Evidence for the advancing cleanliness of war may be counter-factual: it resides not in what happened but in what didn’t—much higher casualty rates.

The drop in Iraqi power
But to be comprehensive we must also consider the drop in Iraqi power between 1990 and 2003. There is a countervailing hypothesis that what we saw in Iraq was not new warfare but an enemy that did not fight.

The decline in Iraqi power from 1991 to 2003 reflected the impact and lingering effects of the first Gulf War, the disruptions associated with the Kurd and Shiite rebellions, and combat actions associated with no-fly zone enforcement. During the 12 years after the first Gulf War, Iraqi per capita GDP averaged between 25% and 30% of the 1989 level, official defense spending declined 85%, and the value of arms imports fell 95%. Expenditures per soldier were probably one third of what they were in 1991. As a result, the modernization of the Iraqi military virtually ceased and training and force maintenance activities were barely performed.

These differences explain the low costs of the second war. And these developments also add something to the cost of the war. The destruction of Iraqi infrastructure in 1991 and the sanctions that followed cost 200,000 lives, according to the best estimates. This figure must be factored into the supposed cleanliness of the war.

Comparisons with wars since WWII
Now I’ll move to the comparisons between recent wars to other relevant wars since World War II. The question remains whether our recent wars set a new standard for speed, decisiveness, and cleanliness. Looking over the past 50 years, we find that the only unambiguously unique thing about today’s wars is the highly favorable casualty-exchange ratio, or attrition ratio. For the conventional phase of the recent Iraq War, among combatants, there were 60 Iraqi losses for every coalition death. This ratio compares to the best ratio achieved by the Israelis in their wars with Arab armies, which was 4 to 1. The exchange ratio reflects a coalition casualty rate of one-tenth of 1%; a historically low cost for battle.

But the characterization of the new warfare as low casualty is supposed to extend to enemy troops and especially noncombatants. This figure is relevant to maintaining legitimacy and avoiding backlash. By this measure, the 2003 war was not unique. The death tolls were comparable to the 1956, 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars and Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Also comparable were the 1965, 1971 and 1999 India-Pakistan wars.

The destruction of Iraqi infrastructure in 1991 and the sanctions that followed cost 200,000 lives...
The answer to the supposed cleanliness of the war.

A good estimate of the war dead on all sides in the recent Afghan war is more than 4,500, including 1,100 civilians. This is much less than the recent Iraq war, but still in range of several of the conflicts mentioned. In Iraq, total dead on all sides is about 5,000-6,000, with the would-be peace being more costly than the war, especially for the United States.

Fast and decisive?
What about the other qualities of the new warfare—“fast” and “decisive?” Rapidity in the Afghan and two Iraq wars also was not unique among the significant wars of the past 35 years, including the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, the India-Pakistan war of 1971 (ending with the dismemberment of Pakistan) and the main combat of the 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Among these conflicts, both the 1971 India-Pakistan war and the Vietnamese takeover were fairly decisive, but in neither case did the victor completely destroy or dismember the other side’s armed forces. Of course, neither of America’s recent wars has won a stable peace.

In sum, only one part of the new warfare hypotheses is valid: the Afghan and Iraq wars show that the United States now has the ability to win decisive battlefield victories at the historically low cost to our forces. However, this ability may not be replicable, given the weakness of the opposition in these wars. And battlefield decisiveness is only a stage of victory, as we see today. Casualties were not uniquely low, nor low enough to avoid serious strategic consequences.

Military transformation
The second iteration of the “new warfare hypothesis” is about how we organize, modernize, and use our armed forces, rather than about national security strategy. The second iteration of the hypothesis thus addresses military transformation. This part of the hypothesis embraces the “fast, decisive and clean,” description of recent wars but goes further to say these outcomes are the first manifestation of a program of military transformation. This part of the hypothesis attempts to conscript the recent US victories to support a unique theory of transformation.

This theory says that old war involved massed firepower, attrition, close combat, deliberate, sequential engagement of the enemy along fronts, separate but coordinated efforts by services, and eventual victory by sheer weight of people, firepower

(continued on next page)
Is There a New Warfare? (continued from page 5)

and material. By contrast, in the new warfare, partially tested in Iraq and Afghanistan, victories are won by out-thinking and out-maneuvering the enemy and attacking the coherence of the enemy's armed forces and command. This sort of attack is supposed to demoralize the enemy and induce paralysis. The ability to achieve this depends on jointness, exploitation of information technology, and development of "information age" organizations.

Information power is supposed to substitute for mass by improving situational awareness, precision and range in attack, coordination among friendly units and making support service more efficient. These improvements in turn allow forces to be smaller, lighter, more dispersed, faster, and more agile.

How are these forces supposed to be used? There are three central concepts: information superiority or dominance, rapid decisive operations (identifying and attacking the enemy's "centers of gravity", and "netcentric" or "network centric warfare." These are the three ideas the Office of Force Transformation would like to see driving transformation.

Many claim that this new warfare explains why the recent Afghan and Iraq wars are decisive and clean.

Historical thinking on transformation

There are two main historic trends of transformational thinking. The first stems from the Cold War effort to deal with numerical inferiority in Europe. The second trend comes from the defense reform movement, which focuses on the rise of new strategic agents and the need to respond to them. There are various strains within this trend. Some would say that the Iraq war shows the need to look less at netcentric warfare than counter-insurgency. Others point to the need to develop peace operations and nation-building capability.

The defense reform movement drove integration. In its most moderate incarnation, this movement translated into a push for jointness, which has become the mainstream Pentagon thinking.

This vision of reform looks to a world with new enemies creating challenges on a smaller scale and in a wider variety of circumstances than US forces are accustomed to. Some of this push for reform showed up in the recent global posture review, which I think is generally good.

Only the capabilities for aerial reconnaissance and precision strike come close to the vision of "netcentric" warfare.

A lot of this push for reform also comes from budget hawks, who point out that the United States has gone from around one quarter to one half of the world's military spending since the Cold War.

Transformation:

evidence from recent wars

What did we see in the recent wars that might speak to transformation efforts? From after action reports, we can look at what changed and what worked.

GPS receivers have clearly achieved ubiquity, which facilitates blue force tracking. But problems still exist across service lines, and thus we've not erased fratricide, which still accounts for 10%-25% of US dead.

The capacity of all weather, day-night strike has generalized across aerial strike assets. This change plus JDAMs allows a few hundred sorties to do what thousands could do during Desert Storm.

Aerial precision strikes have been augmented by a full complement of JSTARS aircraft and datalinks among aerial assets.

The formulation of Air Tasking Orders is down from 72 to less than three to four hours, and the orders make room for some dynamic and time-sensitive targeting. In the later case, the decision-attack cycle has been reduced to 45 minutes or less. That said, dynamic and time-sensitive targeting comprises less than 5% of strike missions. The more deliberate 72-hour targeting process cannot keep up with the pace of rapid maneuver. And problems with Close Air Support remain serious enough to leave the Army resistant to full reliance on it.

Especially noteworthy, was the integration of Special Forces in the targeting cycle, the integration of UAVs and AC-130 gunships, and the general increase in the use of UAVs. But UAVs were not fully integrated into the command structure.

New linkages were established among corps, theater, and component headquarters that could support greater data-sharing in real time among staff. Some commanders spoke of an unprecedented view of the battlefield. Some generals have said that the ideal of sharing a common operational picture was achieved.

These advances are said to be islands, or pockets of netcentric warfare. In truth, only the capabilities for aerial reconnaissance and precision strike come close to this vision - and even these are better regarded as forming a reconnaissance-strike complex, which is a more limited idea and one that is not new. The rest of the evidence shows some improvement in command, control, communication and cooperation. There is impressive progress but not the arrival of network-centric warfare.

In fact, what we see is a variety of service-centric and often incompatible C4I systems,
Is There a New Warfare? (continued from page 6)

some of which were kludged on the eve of war, especially at high levels of command, where they worked reasonably well.

Our capacity to strike from the air has improved in quantity and speed. But our capability to prioritize targets and evaluate damage lags behind - intelligence and analysis lag behind target acquisition. This problem may be getting worse as the pace of operations increases.

There is also a problem with getting actionable and timely intelligence down below the corps and division level, especially regarding disposition of enemy warfighting units. A lot of the fighting in Iraq was what's called meeting engagements - meaning our forces didn't know what they were running into, so intelligence cannot have been great. And getting the aerial strike complex to serve ground units remains a problem. Problems like this led one general to speak of a "digital divide" between those above and below the division level. There are complaints that there is no common operating picture below the corps level. Also, staff have been saturated with information, but too little is relevant or actionable. Even so, they often don't get what they need in a timely fashion, such as current satellite imagery and information on enemy units.

Tactical level communications are having a hard time keeping up with the pace of operations. Terrestrial systems are not as good as they need to be across the theater. And communication capacity is a problem; bandwidth is often insufficient.

Logistics have improved since Desert Storm, especially in regard to getting to the field. But getting materials to tactical units was a problem, especially when these units were maneuvering. Logistics systems remain fragmented across service lines, not integrated and net-centric.

Because of blockages in joint support systems, such as intelligence and logistics, jointness declined during the wars. Some relied on ad-hoc, bubba networks for supply.

In sum, the wars are not proof of the emergence of network centric warfare, despite what you hear. The main advances are in precision-strike ability, both quantitatively and in terms of timeliness. The same amount of sorties can now hit ten times the targets.

Mostly it is the old-fashioned power of ground forces - the continuing strength of skilled people, good equipment and advances in armor - that brings battlefield victory.

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Carl Conetta is a defense analyst and Co-Director of the Project on Defense Alternatives. This article was adapted from a lecture he gave at the MIT Security Studies Program on September 15, 2004.

Is Terrorism World War III? (continued from page 2)

"It's like looking at different markets," [Johnson] says. "We now know that a lot of the fluctuations are universal, irrespective of whether you're looking at trading in New York or Shanghai."

With that in mind, he and his colleagues have developed a simple mathematical model of how insurgent forces are organized into small groups that are continually coalescing and fragmenting. Assuming that the destructive capacity of a group depends on its size and resources, this model predicts the value of the power-law slope found for global terrorism.

The team's conclusion supports the assertion of Mary Kaldor, a political scien-
tist at the London School of Economics, that "the ongoing war in Iraq is a new type of war." Kaldor says that US military action in Iraq has been predicated on the assumption that they are fighting an "old war."

"This is immensely dangerous," Kaldor says. That, it seems, must also be the message for any global "war on terror" - it is not one that can be won by military might, but by new strategies. In "new wars," says Kaldor, military forces should be deployed for law enforcement, and "forces are needed that combine soldiers, police and civilians with the capacity to undertake humanitarian and legal activities."

But if, as Johnson's work suggests, these conflicts have indeed turned into a form of terrorism, they will not be over soon. According to Clauset, the power-law statistics of terrorism show that it "is an endemic feature of the modern world and is likely not something that can be completely eradicated. Instead, it should be considered in a similar way to other endemic problems, such as crime and natural disasters."

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AFL-CIO Passes Anti-War Resolution

At its July 2005 convention, held in New York City, the AFL-CIO adopted a resolution which reads, in part:

The AFL-CIO supports the brave men and women deployed in Iraq, which include our members in all branches of the armed services... Our soldiers... deserve a commitment from our coun-
try's leaders to bring them home as quickly as possible. An unending military presence will waste lives and resources, undermine our nation's security and weaken our military... No foreign policy can be sustained without the informed consent of the American people. The American people were mis-
formed before the war began and have not been informed about the reality on the ground and the very difficult challenges that lie ahead... It is long past time for the Bush administration to level with the American people and for Congress to fulfill its constitutionally mandated oversight responsibilities.
War and Famine: Food Security in Sudan


Likely Responses to Food Security Shock

Comparison of Food and Non-food Commodity Prices in the Bahr El Ghazal Region

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One sack of sorghum = 90 kilograms. All prices in Sudanese Dinars (SDD). 1USD = 233.33SDD at today’s prices.

Conflict or Co-existence? (continued from page 1)

There are solutions
But there are solutions, and they do work. We are getting better all the time at identifying and applying them: those of us who spend our time in the conflict prevention and resolution business are not wasting our time. Let me give you right at the outset just a few figures to make the point. They mostly come from the long awaited Human Security Report - a project supported by five major governments (Canada, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK), edited by Andrew Mack of the University of British Columbia, and to be published next month by Oxford University Press, which has tried to bring together for the first time in a really comprehensive way data about wars, terrorist acts and atrocity crimes that is presently not collected by any international agency.

1) There has been a dramatic decline in the number of armed conflicts since the early 90s - by 80% in the case of conflicts with 1000 or more battle deaths in a year. Although some 60 violent conflicts are still being waged around the world, war between states has almost completely disappeared - now less than 5% of all conflicts - and the overall environment is one of really major reduction.

2) Paralleling the number of conflicts, the number of battle deaths is also dramatically down, both in absolute numbers, and in terms of the deadliness of each individual conflict. Whereas back in the 1950s and for years thereafter the average number of deaths per conflict per year were 30,000-40,000, by the early 2000s this number was down to around 600 - reflecting the shift from high to low intensity conflicts, and geographically from Asia to Africa. Of course violent battle deaths are only a small part of the whole story of the misery of war: as many as 90% of war-related deaths are due to disease and malnutrition rather than direct violence. But the trend decline in battle deaths is a significant and highly encouraging story.

3) There has been a dramatic increase in the number of conflicts resolved by active peacemaking, involving diplomatic negotiations, international mediation and the like: the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change which reported to the Secretary-General in the lead-up to this year's UN Summit, came up with the startling but well-researched statement that more civil wars have been ended by negotiation in the last 15 years than in the previous two centuries.

War between states has almost completely disappeared - now less than 5% of all conflicts and the number of battle deaths is also dramatically down.

There are a number of reasons contributing to these turnarounds - including the end of the era of colonialism, which generated two-thirds or more of all wars from the 1950s to the 1980s; the end of the Cold War, which meant no more proxy wars fuelled by Washington or Moscow and also the demise of a number of authoritarian governments, generating internal resentment and resistance, that each side had been propping up.

But the best explanation is the one that stares us in the face, although many don't want to acknowledge it. This is the huge increase (from four to ten times or more, on the Human Security Report's calculations) in the level of international preventive diplomacy, diplomatic peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building operations, for the most part authorized by and mounted by the United Nations, that has occurred since the end of the Cold War.

And this has been reinforced in turn by the huge increase in the activity of other players, not least NGOs and other civil society actors, working alongside the UN system and governments, needling them into action, acting as partners in delivery, or playing critical support roles in institutional capacity building, community dialogue and confidence building and actual peacemaking through mediation and conciliation.

My own International Crisis Group, for example, which didn't exist ten years ago, is an organization devoted to the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict, which now has an annual budget of around $12 million, and a full-time analysis and advocacy staff of 110 people of over 40 nationalities working in some 50 conflict or potential conflict areas across four continents, with advocacy offices in New York, Washington, Brussels and London - all of us spending our time, with a reasonable degree of success, telling governments what they don't want to hear and persuading them to do what they don't want to do.

What is it that we have learned about what works and what doesn't when it comes to war and civil war? What are the things that governments and intergovernmental organizations have been doing right up to a point, but need to do a lot more of, and a lot more consistently? Let me give you a quick checklist, from my own experience, of the major lessons we have learned - or should have learned - for each main stage of the conflict cycle, starting with conflict prevention.
Conflict or Co-existence (continued from page 9)

Conflict prevention
The first rule of preventing deadly conflict is not to start it, a message the US is certainly now pondering after its rush to war in Iraq. There are circumstances in which there will simply be no alternative to taking military action, to respond to real and immediate cross-border threats, and - in the case of man-made internal crises of the kind we confronted in the Balkans and Rwanda and elsewhere so often in the last decade - in the context of the principle of the “responsibility to protect” now endorsed by last month’s UN Summit (one of its very few positive achievements). But military action should only ever be undertaken in the most serious cases, as a last resort, and in circumstances where it will do more good than harm.

The second rule of conflict prevention is to understand the causes: the factors at work - political, economic, cultural, personal - in each particular risk situation. Don’t be quick to apply grand theories, or make assumptions on the basis of experience elsewhere: look at what is under your nose.

The third rule is to fully understand, and be prepared to apply flexibly as circumstances change, what’s in the conflict prevention toolbox - the range of possible measures, both long-term structural and short-term operational, that can be deployed to deal with high-risk situations. Broadly speaking, there are political and diplomatic tools (e.g., negotiation of new power or resource-sharing arrangements), legal and constitutional tools (e.g., human rights protections for individuals or groups - of the kind often negotiated by the OSCE’s High Commissioner for National Minorities), economic tools (e.g., development measures to redress inequalities, or targeted sanctions) and military tools (including security sector reform, preventive deployments and, in extreme cases, the threat of military force) - and we know a number of lessons we have painfully learned about what makes a successful peace accord:

First, it is not an event so much as a process, and signing the agreement is not the end of it. The critical need is to generate commitment to, and ownership of, the peace by the warring parties: so their commitments are not just formal, but internalized, and will stick. We need to constantly remember the awful examples of the 1994 Rwanda genocide, taking 800,000 lives, which followed the Arusha peace deal just a year before, and the 1991 Bicesse Agreement to end the war in Angola, which was followed by a relapse into bloody conflict for another decade with another million or more lives lost.

Second, any peace accord must deal with all the fundamentals of the dispute: all the issues which will have to be resolved if normality is to return. Sometimes that can be done in a sequential or stage-by-stage way, with confidence building measures now and some key issues deferred: the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the Caucasus might be such an example. But the failed Oslo process for Israel-Palestine shows how risky that approach can be.

Third, any successful peace accord must get the balance right between peace and justice. The South African truth and reconciliation commission model, with its amnesties for the perpetrators of even serious crimes, is widely admired, but in other cases sustainable peace will not be possible without significant retributive justice: visible trial and punishment. What is clear is that the people of every country, whether it’s Cambodia or Rwanda or East Timor or Liberia, have to resolve what works for them.

Fourth, the terms of any accord, and the method of its enforcement and implementation, must be sufficiently resilient to deal with spoilers - those who would seek to undermine or overturn it.

Fifth - and this follows particularly from the last point - a peace accord to be successful must have the necessary degree of international support: with all the guarantees and commitment of resources that are necessary to make it stick.
Post-conflict peacebuilding

The biggest lessons of all about the handling of conflict that we have learned in recent years - not least from Rwanda and Angola as already mentioned, and from Haiti and Afghanistan and now Iraq, is the critical necessity of effective post-conflict peacebuilding, to ensure that the whole weary conflict cycle does not begin again. We know all too well that the best single indicator of future conflict is past conflict - reflecting the reality that over and again the critical underlying conflict-causing factors have simply not been properly addressed.

My quick checklist here of what we have learned about what is necessary to make international peacebuilding missions successful:

1) Sort out who should do what and when - immediately, over a medium transition period and in the longer term: allocate the roles and coordinate them effectively both at headquarters and on the ground. High-level coordination is one of the critical roles envisaged for the new Peacebuilding Commission, approved at the UN Summit - if its detailed operating arrangements can now be agreed.

2) Commit the necessary resources, and sustain that commitment for as long as it takes: this again is envisaged as a critical role for the Peacebuilding Commission, given the long and lamentable history of ad hoc donors' conferences, and rapidly waning attention, and generosity, once the immediate crisis is over.

3) Understand the local political dynamics - and the limits of what outsiders can do. Iraq is an unhappy example of how much can go wrong when that understanding is lacking.

4) Recognize that multiple objectives have to be pursued simultaneously: physical security may always be the first priority, but it cannot be the only one, and rule of law and justice issues, and economic governance and anti-corruption measures, deserve much higher priority than they have usually been given.

5) All intrusive peace operations need an exit strategy, if not an exit timetable, and one that is not just devoted to holding elections as soon as possible, as important as it obviously is to vest real authority and responsibility in the people of the country being rebuilt. Every peacebuilding situation has its own dynamic, but many of the worst peacebuilding mistakes of the last decade have had more to do with leaving too soon or doing too little than staying too long or doing too much.

The response strategy to violent extremism should include the “five Ps” - protection, policing, political, peacebuilding, and psychological strategies.

Confronting terrorism

The contemporary problem of terrorism is in a number of ways more intractable, and more alarming, than that of war between and within states. The positive news, confirmed in the about-to-be-published Human Security Report, is that even since 9/11 and with all the news about new outrages that we wake up to almost every week, the overall death toll from terrorist attack is very low by comparison with the numbers still dying in battle or from war-related disease and malnutrition. But that will only be the case so long as terrorist attacks are conducted with conventional weapons: the casualty rate will soar dramatically if, or perhaps more accurately when, the “big one” occurs - a major terrorist attack using chemical, biological or above all nuclear weapons, a risk which remains all too real given the amount of fissile material in circulation, and the nature of the technical skills needed to construct and deploy an explosive device.

If the “war on terrorism” as it has so far been conducted has been an overall success, that’s a well-kept secret. Terrorist attacks classified by the US government as “significant” more than tripled worldwide to 650 last year from 175 in 2003, and this was the highest annual number since Washington began to collect such statistics two decades ago. Nearly a third of those attacks - 198 of them, nine times the number of the year before - took place in Iraq, meant to be the central front of the war on terror.

I believe that the struggle against violent extremism - and that terminology, now being used by the State Department, is much better than “war on terrorism” - can be won, but it is going to be neither quick nor easy, and it is going to require a lot more thought and application and persistence, a lot more balanced approach, and a lot more attention to underlying causes and currents as distinct from surface manifestations, than comes easily to most of the world’s policy makers. [The “struggle against violent extremism” was a short-lived phrase. The Bush Administration disavowed it within a week of its introduction, ed.]

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan recently sketched the response strategy needed in terms of “five Ps”: “disseminate disaffected groups from choosing terrorism as a tactic to achieve their goals, deter terrorists the means to carry out their attacks, deter states from supporting terrorists, develop state capacity to prevent terrorism, and defend human rights in the struggle against terrorism.”

That list of objectives remains extremely helpful in capturing the flavor of what is required. But I would prefer to put the elements of the required strategy in slightly more operational terms, in terms of “three Ps.” To sketch them very quickly:

Protection strategy. Airline security, border protection, improved public health (continued on next page)
Conflict or Co-existence (continued from page 11)

emergency response measures and all the rest are obviously unavoidable.

Policing strategy. Good police work, supporting intelligence work, and ultimately (in occasional extreme situations) military operations are also obviously indispensable. The hardest issue here is getting the balance right between necessary counter-terrorism measures and indefensible, and possibly counterproductive, intrusions on civil liberty; the risks have to be very great and immediate to justify putting under strain core values about human freedom and dignity that are at the heart of making our societies what they are, not what terrorists want them to be.

Political strategy. A variety of familiar political grievances - the occupation of Palestine and Iraq pre- eminent among them, along with foreign support for so-called apostate governments and so on - are a significant part of the motivations of at least some categories of terrorists. But the main point I want to make about addressing, and being seen to seriously address, political grievances, is that this is not just a strategy designed to appeal to violent extremists themselves, many of whom we know all too well will not be in the slightest moved by advances of this kind.

It is, rather, above all a strategy designed to change the atmospheres in the communities in which terrorists swim, to deny them some of the oxygen they breathe when there is support for their presumed objectives, if not always their most violent behavior. And, in the case of governments in countries where there is strong street sentiment in favor of the political objectives in question, it is a strategy designed to improve the will and capacity of those governments to cooperate effectively internationally, and to crack down effectively domestically.

Political problems that are seen as such throughout the Arab/Islamic world, and which are unresolved, unaddressed, incompetently or counter-productively addressed, or deliberately left to fester until they become so acute they explode, are not the stuff of which willing local governments, capable of acting effectively, are made.

Peacebuilding strategy. We usually talk of peacebuilding in the context not of terrorism but of war between and within states, but it is also highly relevant here, given that one of the central preoccupations of peacebuilding is to avoid the emergence or continuation of failed states - in Afghanistan, Somalia, Sierra Leone or wherever - and we are all acutely now conscious, after the Taliban in Afghanistan, of the role that such states are capable of playing in harboring and nurturing terrorist groups capable of causing real damage elsewhere.

Psychological strategy: It is crucial to change the way people think and feel about terrorism, and to remove any vestige of a comfort zone around it.

It is crucial to change the way people think and feel about terrorism, and to remove any vestige of a comfort zone around it.

At the individual and group level, among those who are or would be terrorists, the psychological task is very specific - to make them understand the wrongness, the indefensibility of their acts, and in the case of Muslims to make them appreciate that such acts, and the suicides so often involved in their perpetration, are absolutely not sanctioned by anything in the Koran. The absence of any kind of accepted institutional hierarchy of authority in Islam on a state or global as distinct from local level, like that which prevails in most other religions, makes very difficult the emergence of authoritative pronouncements in this respect. But efforts have increasingly been made to bring senior clerics and scholars together in Europe and North America and elsewhere to agree upon and pronounce appropriate fatwas, and those efforts should continue.

Anything that spreads the belief that nothing can justify terrorism, that nothing can be an alibi for murder, cannot be anything but helpful.

We should not nurture too many illusions, however, about the likely effect on some violent extremists of these kinds of exhortations from moderate Muslim leaders - let alone inter-faith dialogues. In many cases, including in relation to the groups that the International Crisis Group has been examining closely in Indonesia, turning away present members and potential recruits from violence can probably only be done through individuals who are perceived as having legitimacy within the jihadist movement in question.

At the global level what is needed above all, once and for all, is agreement on what actually constitutes terrorism, viz. a definition that makes attacks on civilians, whatever the context - resistance to foreign occupation or anything else - as absolutely and comprehensively prohibited, and as absolutely indefensible, in the 21st century as slavery and piracy became in the 19th.

We have come a long way in recent times in saving, in the great words of the UN Charter, succeeding generations from the "scourge of war." In saving our peoples from the scourge of violent extremism, by contrast, we have a long way yet to go. But I feel confident that this too is a battle that can be won with the kind of ideas that have emerged over many years, and will continue to emerge, if only the political leadership can be found to implement them.

Gareth Evans is President and CEO of International Crisis Group, a non-governmental organization working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. This article is adapted from a keynote address Mr. Evans gave at Forum 2000's conference on Our Global Co-existence: Challenges and Hopes for the 21st Century, held in Prague in October 2005.
FAST International Monitors the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Background
The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, formerly called Zaire), began with the ousting of the former President and dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko. It is the widest of the post-Colonial African wars, involving up to nine other countries. It is also the most intense and deadly conflict since the end of the Cold War; according to the International Rescue Committee, up to three million people have been killed and millions more internally displaced or seeking asylum in neighboring countries.

Swisspeace, an action-oriented peace-research institute in the area of conflict analysis and peacebuilding, coordinates FAST International, an independent early warning program covering 20 countries/regions in Africa, Europe and Asia. Swisspeace has been monitoring the situation in the DRC since it established its Local Information Network (LIN) there in the summer of 2005. The risk assessment, graph, and table for this article come from the May, 2005 FAST update on the DRC.

Risk assessment
As shown by the roller-coaster quality of the Stability Index (see figure below), the DRC has experienced a succession of crises over the last few months. By far the most serious occurred in December 2004 when President Kagame of Rwanda warned the international community that he would send his troops across the border unless appropriate steps were taken to disarm the former Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), a militia consisting of Hutu rebels, mostly drawn from the former Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) and Interahamwe. Kagali's claims that the FDLR made eleven armed incursions into the country in 2004 seem grossly exaggerated. At no time has the FDLR posed a mortal threat to Rwanda, yet there is no question that they do pose serious threats to the security of civilians in Eastern Congo, where they number between seven and eight thousand.

Strong diplomatic pressures from the UN Security Council, the African Union, the European Union and the US were instrumental in defusing the crisis. The most promising sign for a normalization of DRC-Rwanda relations, however, came with the announcement in Rome, on March 30, 2005, that the FDLR had agreed to lay down their arms, and to accept "their voluntary disarmament and the peaceful return of their forces to Rwanda."

Since then other portents of instability have emerged, including the following:

1) In January violent demonstrations erupted in Kinshasa after the head of the National Electoral Commission raised the possibility of a postponement of the elections. Four people were reported killed. The government blamed members of Etienne Tshisekedi's Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social (UPDS) for the unrest.

2) On May 13 an attempt at secession was nipped in the bud in Katanga province, leading to the arrest of at least 35 civilians and military officers; some reports say 100.

3) In mid-May violent demonstrations erupted in Mbuji-Mayi, in the Kasai region, in protest against a 6-month extension of the transitional period initially scheduled to end in June 2005.

4) In February nine UN peacekeepers were killed in Ituri, leading to the arrest of several militia leaders, including Thomas Lubanga, head of the Union des patriotes Congolais (UPC), Mandro Panga Kahwa of the Parti pour l'unité, la sauvegarde et l'intégrité du Congo (PUSIC) and Germain Katanga of Forces de résistance patriotiques en Ituri (FRPI).

Prospects for stability
Prospects for future stability will hinge in large part on whether the commitment to disarm made by the FDLR leadership will be heeded by local commanders on the ground, and, if not, whether the Congolese army has the capacity - and will - to disarm them. On both counts the prospects are far from encouraging. Internal obstacles to the implementation of the Rome accords include the extreme fragmentation of the FDLR, their operational autonomy and tendency to shift sides. Hardliners within the FDLR are unlikely to agree to a deal that many would consider as political suicide. Nor are they willing to take the risk of going... (continued on next page)
FAST Update on the DRC (continued from page 13)

back to Rwanda. As for the Congolese armed forces, not only do they lack the military capabilities to disarm the FDLR, but there is not the will to do so amongst those high ranking officers with ties to the rebels.

Rwanda’s response to the announcement has been characteristically cautious, if not downright counter-productive. Charles Murigande, Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs, has warned that should FDLR combatants live up to their declaration to disarm, they “will have to account for their actions during the genocide,” a statement which is as much a warning as it is a disincentive to lay down their arms. It is easy to see why, from a strategic standpoint, the disarmament of the FDLR would not serve Rwanda’s interests in the DRC. If implemented, the Rome accords would deprive Kagame of a major justification for renewed incursions into the DRC (the other being the protection of its ethnic clients).

While Rwanda has been unwilling to provide carrots to the FDLR, Kinshasa has wielded few sticks. No effort has been made to get the demobilization and disarmament process under way. This is hardly surprising when one considers the extent to which fractures within the army, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), tend to replicate the political divisions in North and South Kivu. This was made clear during the December crisis, when the commander of the 8th military region, General Obéd Rwibasira, a Rwandaphone Tutsi from North Kivu, turned against the troops sent by Kinshasa to repel the invasion. In fact, it now appears that very few Rwandan troops took part in the fighting in Kanyabayonga in mid-December, and that many of the so-called “invaders” were ethnic Tutsis sympathetic to the more radical wing of the Rassemblement Démocratique Congolais-Goma (RCD-Goma). Again, it would seem that much of the footing that occurred in the region was done by FARDC troops whose salaries had not been paid and who were sent to the front lines without food supplies.

Although Rwibasira has been replaced by General Gabriel Amisi, another ex-RCD officer, as commander of the 8th military region, the relations between the 10th and 8th military regions remain tense. The troops of the 8th military region consist almost entirely of ex-RCD soldiers whose sympathies lie with the RCD-Goma. Doubts as to their loyalty to the transitional government are the main reasons for the recent arrival of some 10,000 FARDC troops in North Kivu. There is also growing evidence that in some localities former RCD troops are resisting their incorporation into mixed units of the FARDC.

In the short run, the prospects for stability have improved significantly since the December crisis. Especially noteworthy are:

1) The reactivation of the Joint Monitoring Mechanism, established by Rwanda and the DRC in the wake of the Bukavu crisis (May-June 2004);
2) The establishment of a buffer zone between Rwanda and the DRC, north and south of Kanyabayonga in North Kivu, protected by elements of the South African Defence Forces;
3) The arrest by the MONUC of key militia leaders in Ituri following the killing of nine UN peacekeepers by the UPC;
4) The rapid defusing of the attempted Katanga secession in May;
5) The strengthening of the hands embargo at the request of the UN Secretary General; and
6) The adoption in May of a constitution by the Congolese National Assembly, thus removing a major obstacle in the way of the organization of elections.

Over the long-term, however, the picture is not nearly as bright. Rwanda’s surveillance capacity cannot be overestimated, to help safeguard its political and economic interests in the DRC, Kigali is willing to go that extra mile (across the border), even if it means putting at risk the lives of ethnic Tutsi. To counter this threat the FARDC simply does not measure up. The FARDC are no match for the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF), in terms of equipment, professionalism and strategic skills. The balance of military forces, in short, will remain to Rwanda’s advantage for years to come.

For more on the FAST International Early Warning project and the work of Swisspeace, visit www.swisspeace.org.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description/Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Events</td>
<td>All coded events, both peaceful and conflictual. Local Information Networks (LINS) in each country or region collect, track and report relevant information in accordance with a specific set of indicators and categories. LINS are trained and their data are verified by FAST International Early Warning Program analysts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Actions</td>
<td>Proportion of All Actions to All Events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Direct Actions</td>
<td>Proportion of Direct Actions compared to All Events. Direct Actions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expe, seize, and force. These categories encompass direct actions regardless of origin or target.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relative Forceful Actions</td>
<td>Proportion of Forceful Action events compared to All events. The indicator also reflects the shared extent of an event.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Conflict Carrying Capability | The Conflict Carrying Capacity (or CCC) is a composite index that departs the overall stability of the country or region of interest. The CCC is operationalized in terms of the multiplicative interaction among three proportional measures: 1) conflict contentions or the proportion of civil actions that are reported as contentious or “direct” and thus challenge the state’s monopoly on conflict regulation; 2) state repression or the proportion of state actions that are reported as extra-institutional or “direct” both in response to direct challenges from the civil society and those initiated by the state to repress and control opposition; and 3) violent contention or the proportion of actions entailing physical damage to persons or property. The index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability.
| Country Stability | The country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country. |
| Cooperative | Proportion of all actions belonging to all cooperative categories (yield, comment, consult, approve, promise, grant, reward, agree, request, and propose) to All Events. |
| Conflictual | Proportion of all actions belonging to all conflictive categories (reject, accuse, protest, deny, demand, warn, threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expe, seize, and force) to All Events.
**EPS at the 2006 AEA/ASSA Conference**
January 6 - 8, 2006
Boston, MA

**EPS Roundtable: Grand Strategy against Global Poverty**
Saturday, January 7, 10:15am
Sheraton, Constitution B

Chair: James Galbraith, University of Texas at Austin
Participants: Richard Jolly, University of Sussex
Nancy Birdsall, Invited, Center for Global Development
Amartya Sen, Harvard University
Joseph Stiglitz, Columbia University

**AEA Session (organized by EPS): The Costs of War**
Sunday, January 8, 8:00AM
Sheraton, Republic B

Chair: James Galbraith, University of Texas at Austin
Participants: Steven Kosiak, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
*The Costs of the Iraq War*
William Nordhaus, Yale University
*Is US Military Spending Justified by Security Threats?*
Allen Sinai, Decision Economics
*Wars and the Macroeconomy: The Case of Iraq*
Joseph Stiglitz, Columbia University
*The Economics of War and its Aftermath: The Case of Iraq*
Bassam Yousif, Indiana State University
*Economic and Political Instability in Iraq: The Effects of Coalition Policies*

**Joint EPS-AEA Roundtable: Economics and National Security**
Sunday, January 8, 1:00pm
Hynes Convention Center, Room 210

Chair: Michael Intriligator, University of California at Los Angeles
Participants: Peter Galbraith, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Carl Kaysen, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Lawrence Korb, Center for American Progress
Richard Kaufman, Bethesda Research Institute
Gareth Porter, Foreign Policy in Focus
Robert Solow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

For the second year, EPS will have a booth in the exhibitor’s hall at the 2006 AEA/ASSA Conference. We will be in the last row to your right as you enter the exhibit hall. Please stop by and see us.
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EPS at the 2006 AEA/ASSA Conference
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EPS Members Meeting
Saturday, January 7, 2006, 5:30pm
Dalton Room, Sheraton Boston Hotel
Prudential Center, 39 Dalton Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02199

The membership meeting is open; all are welcome to join us.

EPS Fellows Meeting
Sunday, January 8, 2006, 10:00am
Fairfax B, Sheraton Boston Hotel
Prudential Center, 39 Dalton Street
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Only EPS fellows may attend; fellows in good standing may vote.

EPS Annual Dinner
honoring
Amartya K. Sen

Saturday, January 7, 2006 at 6:30pm
Constitution Room B, Sheraton Boston Hotel

Host Committee Chair:
  Sir Richard Jolly

Host Committee:
  Tony Atkinson, Nancy Birdsall, Meghnad Desai, John Lord Eatwell,
  David Ellerman, Richard Freeman, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, J.
  Kenneth Galbraith, Neva Goodwin, Selim Jahan, Martha
  Nussbaum, Anthony Shorrocks, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Paul Streeten,
  Lawrence Summers, Robert H. Wade, James Wolfensohn, Ernesto Zedillo

Remarks by:
  John Lord Eatwell, His Excellency Ambassador Ronan Sen,
  Sir Richard Jolly, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Lawrence H. Summers

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