As the economic news darkens, the ideas to stimulate new jobs get worse. A sure-fire way to entrench deeper into recession is now being spread around: spend even more on the Defense Department. Doing that will not generate new jobs effectively, and it will perpetuate serious problems in the Pentagon. President Obama would be well advised to go in precisely the opposite direction.

No less a worthy than Harvard economist Martin Feldstein has advocated in the Wall Street Journal (“Defense Spending Would Be Great Stimulus,” December 24, 2008) adding $30 billion or so to the Pentagon budget for the stated purpose of generating 300,000 new jobs. In pushing the Defense Department as a jobs engine, Professor Feldstein demonstrated that he knows the Defense Department about as well as I know economics – which is not at all.

With its huge overhead costs, glacial pay out rates, and ultra-high materials costs, Pentagon spending can generate jobs, but not so many and not so soon. A classic foible is Professor Feldstein’s assertion to surge the economy with “Additional funding [that] would allow the Air Force to increase the production of fighter planes...”

Today, the Air Force has two fighters in production, the F-22 “Raptor” and the F-35 “Joint Strike Fighter.” The F-22 is now at the end of approved production, but the Air Force would love to have at least 60 more. However, even if Congress appropriated today the $11 billion needed for them, the work would not start until 2010 - too late for the stimulus everyone agrees is needed now.

Professor Feldstein thinks it can be otherwise. He is probably thinking of the World War II model where production lines cranked out thousands of aircraft a month - as fast as the government could stuff money, materials, and workers into the assembly line. The problem is that there is no such assembly line for the F-22. Although they are fabricated in a large facility where aircraft production hummed in bygone eras, F-22s are today built by hand – pre-Henry Ford style. Go to the plant; you will find no detectable movement of aircraft out the door. Instead, you will see virtually stationary aircraft and workers applying parts in a manner more evocative of hand-crafting. This “production rate” generates one F-22 every 18 days, or so.

The current rate for the F-35, now just at the start of its production, is even slower, although the Air Force would like to get its “rate” up to a whopping 10 to 15 per month.

Why don’t we just speed things up? We can’t. The specialized materials the F-22 requires must be purchased a year or two ahead of time, and with the advance contracting and all the other palaver required by today’s regulations, the Pentagon bureaucracy is functionally incapable of speeding production up anytime soon, if ever. In point of fact, adding more F-22 production money does not mean adding to the production rate or the total number of jobs. It does mean simply extending the current F-22 production rate of 20 per year into the future. The existing jobs will be saved, but no new jobs will be created.

The 6th Anniversary of the Iraq War Issue

Since 1998 we have spent about... $1.4 trillion more than we would have spent had we remained at the 1998 baseline. About $800 billion (57%) of this increase was devoted to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

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Repudiate the Carter Doctrine
Michael Klare

Twenty-nine years ago, President Jimmy Carter adopted the radical and dangerous policy of using military force to ensure US access to Middle Eastern oil. “Let our position be absolutely clear,” he said in his State of the Union address on January 23, 1980. “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region [and thereby endanger the flow of oil] will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”

This principle, known ever since as the Carter Doctrine, led to US involvement in three major wars, and now risks further military entanglement in the greater Gulf area. It’s time to repudiate this doctrine and satisfy US energy needs without reliance on military intervention.

Focusing on the Gulf
Carter enunciated his doctrine at a moment when US officials were worried about the recent Islamic revolution in Iran and the concurrent Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. Both actions, it was believed, threatened the US ability to ensure uninterrupted access to Persian Gulf oil. “The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance,” Carter said in his pivotal address. “It contains more than two-thirds of the world’s exportable oil.” Of particular concern: “The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz, a waterway through which most of the world’s oil must flow.”

Because the United States at that time did not possess any forces specifically earmarked for action in the Gulf, President Carter created a new military body, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), to undertake operations in the region. He also expanded the US naval presence in the Gulf and acquired new basing facilities in the wider region. Carter authorized covert operations in Afghanistan, which most of the world’s oil must flow.”

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The Newsletter of Economists for Peace & Security
Letter from the Director

Six years ago, in February 2003, EPS circulated a statement against the impending war in Iraq. In that letter we stated that the “policy of sponsoring a new war in the Middle East plays ‘Russian roulette’ with our economy. Instead, our leaders should focus on restoring our economy and stimulating job growth. The American people cannot afford to tolerate a mismanaged economy or a naïve underestimation of America’s economic perils.” We predicted problems in housing, energy and financial markets, and massive shortfalls in state budgets.

That these predictions have come to pass cannot be entirely laid at the feet of the war in Iraq. However, I think we can safely say that policymakers have been distracted by the bogeyman - terrorism. EPS’s board members were not the only prominent economists to see what was coming.

So, this issue of the Quarterly marks the observation of the sixth anniversary of the start of the war in Iraq. In 2003, we pledged to take the opportunity each March (for the duration) to evaluate the war and the military budget. Here, we reprint a presentation that Charles Knight of the Project on Defense Alternatives offered in July of last year, outlining a plan for withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. I’m sure Charles is working on a reaction to President Obama’s just-released plan for troop withdrawal, but the piece is still relevant for the insights it gives into failures at the strategic level. First, we miscalculated what might be accomplished by force of arms, failing to appreciate the limits on the utility of military power. Second, we failed to appreciate the power and dynamics of identity politics... and the likely reaction to foreign occupation. Third, we failed to take seriously the importance of international cooperation and legitimacy in the eyes of the world.

These warnings can usefully be applied to escalation in Afghanistan as well. In his op-ed, Lessons Learned, Representative Neil Abercrombie of Hawaii suggests that before we get further involved in another war, we take time to really think about our goals, and look for the best (most cost-efficient, most likely to be successful) way to accomplish them. My guess is that no one’s goal is to get involved in another incipient civil war among factions we don’t really understand, on difficult terrain with which we are unfamiliar. Sounds like a recipe for Quagmire III - or IV, if you count Korea, from which we have still not fully extracted ourselves.

According to the 2009 National Intelligence Review, terrorism is no longer the number one threat to US security. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair reported to the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 13, “The primary near-term security concern of the United States is the global economic crisis and its geopolitical implications.” In this light, we should be especially sure that some real goal can be reached by military means before we commit any more blood or treasure to Afghanistan.

Indeed, we are all concerned about the economy. There are voices in Washington who claim that military spending is the only legitimate expense for a libertarian government; they call for an increase in the defense budget, inferring that increased defense spending will help stimulate the economy. Bill Hartung and Winslow Wheeler disagree.

The administration also recently released the top line budget numbers for 2010 (overall funding level without including programmatic specifics, which will be released in April). The military budget has grown 45 percent in the last 8 years. Carl Conetta, Charles Knight and James McGovern argue that it’s time to take a good hard look at what we are buying with that money and whether it might be time to “adjust” our national security planning.

Much has changed on the military and budgetary front since a year ago. And much has not. President Obama has already moved to reverse many of the worst excesses of the last eight years, but defense contractors and fear-mongers have many loud advocates in Washington. Clear voices for looking before we leap will need to be just as loud.
Congressman Frank’s Plan To Reduce Military Spending

On February 24, 2009, Congressman Barney Frank (D-Mass) convened a forum on military spending to discuss ways to restrain excessive military spending while maintaining a strong defense. He outlined the following plan to reduce US military spending by 25 percent, stating, “If we are not able to get military spending under control, if we are not able to break the trend that’s now there, we will not be able to respond to important domestic needs.”

1. Withdrawal From Iraq

A timely withdrawal from Iraq could create $105 billion in savings in year one, if the recommendations from Center for American Progress report “Building a Military for the 21st Century” are followed.

At the present time, the United States is spending about $10 billion a month to maintain over 140,000 troops a year in Iraq and $2 billion a month to support 34,000 American troops in Afghanistan. If President Obama withdraws all combat brigades from Iraq over the January 2009 to April 2010 period, this would decrease the U.S. presence by about 50,000, or about 36 percent, and reduce the cost to about $7 billion a month by mid-2010.

If the withdrawal of combat troops is accompanied by a withdrawal of an equal number of support troops, this would mean that the costs would drop to about $4 billion a month. If all American troops are withdrawn by the end of calendar year 2011, as the Status of Forces Agreement mandates, the costs would drop to zero by the second quarter of FY 2012.

Adding another 20,000 troops to Afghanistan, as requested by General McKiernan, would increase the costs in that theatre by at least $1.5 billion a month. Thus, the savings from a draw-down from Iraq accompanied by an increase in Afghanistan would result in a net savings of about $2.5 billion a month until the complete withdrawal from Iraq. At that time, the monthly costs for Afghanistan would be $3.5 billion. Thus, the net savings from a complete withdrawal from Iraq over the next four years would be $316 billion (after $54 billion is offset by the increase of our forces in Afghanistan). If $76 billion is allocated to reset, the net savings would be approximately about $240 billion.

2. Center for American Progress/Institute for Policy Studies “Unified Security Budget”

An additional $60B could be saved by eliminating wasteful weapons systems, reducing the number of active nuclear warheads and tightening procurement processes to reduce waste, fraud and abuse, as outlined in the Foreign Policy in Focus report “A Unified Security Budget.”

The table below illustrates CAP’s list of items that total $60B. Taken together, the billion this gets us most of the way to 25% ($165.7 billion) of the estimated $700B defense budget for FY09. 25% of $700 billion is $175 billion. The amount saved from tightening up auditing and procurement oversight can be stretched to fill the gap.

Barney Frank has been in Congress since 1981. He is the Chairman of the Financial Services Committee.


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<th>Administration’s FY 2008 Request</th>
<th>CAP Report’s Proposed Change</th>
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<td>F/A-22 Raptor</td>
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<td>Ballistic Missile Defense</td>
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The Economics of Peace and Security Journal
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This journal raises and debates all issues related to the political economy of personal, communal, national, international, and global peace and security. The scope includes implications and ramifications of conventional and nonconventional conflict for all human and non-human life and for our common habitat. Special attention is paid to constructive proposals for conflict resolution and peacemaking. While open to non-economic approaches, most contributions emphasize economic analysis of causes, consequences, and possible solutions to mitigate conflict.

The journal is aimed at specialist and non-specialist readers, including policy analysts, policy and decision makers, national and international civil servants, members of the armed forces and of peacekeeping services, the business community, members of non-governmental organizations and religious institutions, and others. Contributions are scholarly or practitioner-based, but written in a general-interest style.

Articles in The EPS Journal are solicited by the editors and subject to peer review. Readers are, however, encouraged to submit proposals for articles or symposia (2 to 4 articles on a common theme), or to correspond with the editors over specific contributions they might wish to make. In addition, comments on published articles (<800 words) are welcome.

EPS members receive a 25% discount on the annual subscription to the Economics of Peace and Security Journal. Regular one-year subscriptions are $40 per year; for EPS members the one-year subscription is $30.

Symposium: Defense innovation
Renaud Bellais on defense innovation and venture capital
Sylvain Daffix and Yves Jacquin on European defense R&D and national R&D systems
Peter Hall and Andrew James on industry structure and innovation in the British defense sector

Symposium: Economics of conflict—theory and micro-level evidence
Philip Verwimp introduces the symposium articles
S. Mansoob Murshed on greed, grievance, and social contract
M. Zulfan Tadjoeddin and Anis Chowdhury on violence in Indonesia
Ana Maria Ibáñez on forced displacement in Colombia
Steven Spittaels and Filip Hilgert on conflict mapping in the Congo

Articles
Christopher E.S. Warburton on war and exchange rate valuation
Steve Chan on the democratic peace proposition
Steve Townsend on Thomas Friedman’s First Law of Petropolitics
Ronen Bar-El, Kobi Kagan, and Asher Tishler on military planning

Editors
Jurgen Brauer, Augusta State University, Augusta, GA, USA
J. Paul Dunne, University of the West of England, Bristol, UK
Repudiate the Carter Doctrine
Continued from page 2

As is well known, Bush Sr. chose not to invade Baghdad after driving Iraqi forces out of Kuwait but rather to seek Hussein’s ouster through economic warfare. This led to the imposition of economic sanctions on Iraq, a policy also embraced by President Bill Clinton. Although justified in terms of undermining Hussein’s ability to acquire WMD and other advanced military capabilities, the sanctions’ ultimate goal was to eliminate a threat to the safety of Persian Gulf oil, in accordance with the Carter Doctrine. And when these measures failed to achieve the intended objective, at least in the eyes of President Bush Jr., the only apparent alternative was direct US military intervention.

Like his father in the days leading up to Operation Desert Storm, George W. Bush avoided referring to oil and spoke solely of WMD and human rights when talking of the need to eliminate Saddam Hussein. But his vice president, Dick Cheney, wasn’t so reticent. In an August 2002 speech before the Veterans of Foreign Wars, he laid out the strategic reasons for attacking Iraq, saying: “Armed with an arsenal of [WMD] and a seat atop 10% of the world’s oil reserves, Saddam Hussein could then be expected to seek domination of the entire Middle East, take control of a great portion of the world’s energy supplies, and [directly threaten America’s friends throughout the region].” As such, the current war in Iraq can best be viewed as part of a series of US military moves taken in accordance with Carter’s January 1980 pronouncement.

Obama and the Carter Doctrine
It would be enormously reassuring to conclude that the Iraq War is the last in this series, that the departure of President Bush and the arrival of President Obama signify the end of US involvement in Middle Eastern wars over oil. But there's no reason to assume that this is in fact the case. True, Obama has spoken repeatedly of his desire to withdraw US combat troops from Iraq and to hasten the development of petroleum alternatives so as to reduce US reliance on Middle Eastern oil. But he has not specifically repudiated the Carter Doctrine or its underlying premises. Rather, he has emphasized the need to preserve a robust US military presence in the Persian Gulf area and to use force when necessary to protect vital American interests there, though exactly what these interests may be, he has yet to spell out in detail.

Most of the commentary on Obama's Iraq policy has focused on his pledge to remove US combat troops from the region. But in his first major speech as a candidate on national security affairs, at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs on April 23, 2007, he said that he was aware “that there are risks involved” in reducing American troop levels. “That is why,” he continued, “my plan provides for an over-the-horizon force that could prevent chaos in the wider region.” Obama hasn’t spelled out what he means by such a force, but presumably it would entail a larger air and naval presence in the greater Gulf region along with additional US deployments in friendly countries like Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.

President Obama also warned of the threat posed by Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons in much the same alarmist language George W. Bush used. Although he has emphasized reliance on diplomacy to achieve a peaceful outcome to this peril, Obama hasn’t categorically ruled out the use of military force. Considering that the Iranians have repeatedly warned they’ll respond to any American attack on their territory by blocking the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, it’s obvious the US dispute with Iran over WMD, no less than that with Iraq, is closely tied to the geopolitical thrust of the Carter Doctrine. Thus, while any US attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would be aimed in the first instance at neutralizing a potential nuclear danger, the ultimate objective would be to ensure the safety of Persian Gulf oil supplies.

So long as the United States adheres to a policy that legitimates the use of military force to protect the flow of oil, we run the risk of involvement in one war after another in the ever-volatile Persian Gulf region. True, other issues and objectives have been associated with these wars, but the underlying strategic premise for every US intervention in the Gulf since 1980 has been the core concept of the Carter Doctrine: to disallow a hostile power from gaining control of the region and blocking our access to its oil.

This policy has done little to ensure us uninterrupted access to oil, and cost us great pain, misery, and expense. Despite the $600 billion or so we have already spent on the Iraq War (on the way to an estimated $2-$3 trillion, when all associated and follow-up costs are included), Iraq today is producing less oil today than it did when US troops invaded the country six years ago. And despite the mammoth US military presence in the Gulf area, Iran emerged as a major regional power amidst a rise in piracy and militant Islam. When all is said and done, conventional military force is an ineffective tool for protecting far-flung, highly vulnerable oil facilities and trade routes.

There’s only one way to reduce America’s vulnerability to the disruption in overseas petroleum deliveries and that is to become less dependent on oil, period. We can’t drill our way out of this predicament because the United States simply lacks enough domestic petroleum.
Repudiate the Carter Doctrine

Michael T. Klare is a professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, the author of Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy (Metropolitan Books, 2008), and a Foreign Policy In Focus columnist. Klare’s previous book, Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing Dependency on Imported Petroleum, has been made into a documentary movie. To order and view a trailer, visit www.bloodandoilmovie.com. This article first appeared at Foreign Policy in Focus (www.fpif.org).

Volume 21 / Issue 1 • March 2009

Repudiate the Carter Doctrine

William Hartung and Christopher Preble

Defense Doesn’t Need Stimulus

As the Obama administration and Congress move forward with a multifaceted economic-stimulus package with a price tag of hundreds of billions of dollars, yet another interest group has staked its claim to a share of those funds – the nation’s defense contractors.

The arms lobby and its supporters in the think-tank world have made their case in a series of ads, articles and talking points. Martin Feldstein of the American Enterprise Institute describes defense spending as a “great stimulus.” Weekly Standard editor Bill Kristol agrees. Noting that the military was “spending all kinds of money already,” Mr. Kristol wondered aloud, “If you’re buying 2,000 Humvees a month, why not buy 3,000? If you’re refurbishing two military bases, why not refurbish five?”

Such comments ignore that military spending is supposed to serve one central purpose: advancing US security. The defense budget is not a jobs program, nor should it be. Decisions on how many Humvees to buy, or how many bases to refurbish, should rest on military necessity, not economic expediency subject to political chicanery. When military procurement becomes nothing more than a series of thinly veiled pork-barrel projects, it risks exposing our troops to unnecessary risks, and ultimately undermines our security.

This is not the first time that defense spending has been endorsed as a way to jump-start the economy. Nearly five decades ago, economic advisers to President Kennedy urged him to increase military spending as an economic stimulus. In a report for the incoming administration, Paul Samuelson warned that such spending ought not be “the football of economic stabilization,” but maintained that “any stepping-up of [defense] programs that is deemed desirable for its own sake can only help rather than hinder” the health of the economy.

Similar arguments are heard today. The members of Connecticut’s congressional delegation have been particularly outspoken in their support for the Virginia-class submarine, and they haven’t been shy about pointing to the jobs that the program provides in their home state. The Marine Corps’ V-22 Osprey program wins support on similar grounds. Despite serious concerns about crew safety and comfort, the V-22 program employs workers in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware and Texas, and a number of other states.

Or take the case of the F-22 combat aircraft. The Pentagon had pledged to cap the F-22 program at 183 aircraft - a sensible decision, given that our most dangerous adversaries are al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban insurgents that don’t possess even a single aircraft. The Air Force tried to send F-22s to Iraq, but Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates denied their request.

Undaunted, the arms industry, the Air Force and their friends in Congress are attempting to keep the production line open indefinitely. At more than $350 million each, the F-22 is the most expensive fighter plane ever built. Buying more now will distort the defense budget and crowd out other projects that are more relevant to the threats we face.

Plans to add tens of thousands of personnel to our armed forces will have a similar distorting effect. The resulting payroll increases will come at a high price to taxpayers and to our long-term security. As the war in Iraq winds down, there is no obvious reason to increase the size of our military, especially since we shouldn’t be planning to fight more Iraq-style wars. It makes far more sense to ensure that we maintain or improve the quality of the existing force than it does to add numbers for numbers sake.

Consideration of the potentially beneficial economic effects of Pentagon spending merely impedes our ability to build and maintain the military we need. Politicians should not be rewarded for pushing projects that do not align with our strategic objectives.

Using the Pentagon budget as a source of economic stimulus is a bad bargain. President Obama should resist calls for more military spending while his administration reorients the Pentagon’s budget to reflect a new, more realistic set of security goals.

William Hartung is director of the Arms and Security Initiative at the New America Foundation. Christopher Preble is director of foreign-policy studies at the Cato Institute. This article was first published as a Special to the WASHINGTON TIMES, in January 2009.
Responsible Governance Requires a Closer Look at the Pentagon Budget

Charles Knight, Carl Conetta and James P. McGovern

In late September while Congress debated the $700 billion bailout of America's financial system, Defense Secretary Robert Gates stood before an audience at the National Defense University and asserted that the Pentagon was having a hard time living within its $500 billion baseline budget. "Yes," he added, "it is sign I've been at the Pentagon for too long to say that with a straight face."

Certainly a half-trillion dollars is a vast sum. And Secretary Gates is right to worry that in hard economic times increases to his budget will appear less than reasonable.

There is nothing about the absolute size of a half-trillion dollar Pentagon budget that should concern Americans if that expenditure is necessary for the defense of the nation and if, as a nation, we are rich enough to foot the bill. In the shadow of the 9/11 attacks and subsequent wars, the Pentagon budget has been exempted from the type of scrutiny it received during the 1990s. But it constitutes so much of our discretionary spending and has contributed so much to our deficit spending that we can no longer afford to look the other way.

The last ten years have seen the Pentagon's "baseline budget" grow by 45% - from $358 billion in 1997 to $518 billion today - a $160 billion boost, not including much of the funding for current wars and new expenditures for Homeland Security.

The Congressional Budget Office estimates that Pentagon planning will likely require the baseline budget to grow another $30 billion in coming years. And it has been reported that the Bush administration has passed on to the Obama administration a revised five year defense plan which will push the baseline budget up another $80 billion to $600 billion.

Today, America faces a number of critical challenges. Our national security needs are real and enduring. There also is an immediate need to shore-up our economy and speed relief to Americans facing hard times. Looking to the future, a wave of retirement is approaching and with it, burgeoning social security and Medicare needs. Americans of all ages want reform of the healthcare system in order to improve access to quality care and make it more affordable. We need diverse educational investments and major investments to reduce energy dependency and curb global warming.

Meanwhile America is slipping further into recession, likely to be the worst since the 1930s. The next several years are expected to add several trillions of dollars to our already outstanding national debt of $10 trillion. As debt rises relative to revenue and new demands on the budget loom, we simply must use our resources judiciously. With millions of American households facing their own budget crises, the next congress will be expected to exercise more vigilant oversight of the government budget, the Pentagon's included.

Since 1998 we have spent about $5 trillion on defense (in 2008 dollars), $1.4 trillion more than we would have spent had we remained at the 1998 baseline. About $800 billion (57%) of this increase was devoted to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Resolution of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan would dramatically reduce the demands on the Pentagon budget. The remaining $600 billion (43%) are additions to baseline spending. There is much in baseline spending that deserves closer scrutiny.

We are currently adding nearly 100,000 troops to the Army and Marine Corps. These two services have suffered excessive strain in recent years due to the long occupation of Iraq. But the increase is designed to be permanent. And this part of the plan begs fundamental questions: What have we learned from our Iraq experience? Is long-term, large-scale military occupation of a foreign country worthwhile or even practical road to greater security? If not, why buy a permanent capability to do it again?

Apart from our current wars, the United States maintains a very large military presence abroad. Even in peace-time we keep more than 200,000 personnel on foreign soil and 30,000 sailors on more than 100 deployed ships and submarines. No other nation does remotely as much. And we are planning to do more - with the recent addition of a new regional military command covering Africa. Some of this serves to deter specific foes, but most serves a vague goal of "environment shaping." Is this the best, most cost-effective way to influence world events? Or might more be done at less cost and more effectively through the State Department and through regional and global institutions?

Finally, the Pentagon hopes to renovate US nuclear capabilities, proceed with national missile defense efforts, and explore the potentials of anti-satellite and space-based weapons. But these efforts are plagued by questions about their effects on international stability and on arms control, and about their feasibility and reliability. In the case of nuclear weapons, perhaps the best course is to retire much of our stockpile in tandem with reductions by other nuclear powers.

Any adjustment in national security planning is bound to be controversial - and it should be. But we can no longer afford to shy away from that controversy. Our current circumstance demands that we enter into a broad and deep discussion about national strategic priorities, including security priorities. And this necessarily entails looking behind the curtain that shields the defense budget from more serious scrutiny.

Charles Knight and Carl Conetta are co-directors of the Project on Defense Alternatives (www.comw.org/pda/) at the Commonwealth Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Mr. Conetta was a Research Fellow of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (IDDS) and also served for three years as editor of the IDDS journal Defense and Disarmament Alternatives. Rep. James P. McGovern is a US Representative for Massachusetts' 3rd Congressional District, as well as Vice Chairman of the House Rules Committee.
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would get to 300,000 new jobs with the rest of his money is pure mystery. More F-22 spending is a money surge for Lockheed, but not a jobs engine for the nation.

Even if we could speed up production for the other fighter, the F-35, it would be stupid to do so. The F-35 is just beginning the testing phase, and it has been having some real problems, requiring design changes. That discovery process is far from over. We should put the aircraft into full production after, not before, all the needed modifications are identified. Overanxious to push things along much too fast to permit a “fly before you buy” strategy, the Air Force already has scheduled the production of about 500 F-35s before testing is complete. Going faster would make a bad acquisition plan even worse.

And, by the way, if you want fighters that make a real difference in war, both the F-22 and the F-35 are terrible ideas. Even if they were to perform as advertised – and the F-22 doesn’t, and the F-35 never will – they are both huge disappointments. Aerodynamically, the F-22 is barely an improvement over early models of the F-15 it is replacing, and the F-35 is a clear step backward from early F-16s. Both also rely on a hypothetical vision of ultra-long range, radar-based air-to-air combat that has fallen on its face many times in real air war. For air-to-ground warfare, the F-22 is an irrelevancy that has failed to fly a single mission over Iraq or Afghanistan, and the F-35 brings only slicker command and control for the use of existing munitions.

Even some economists are skeptical about Professor Feldstein’s numbers. A paper from the University of Massachusetts-Amherst (“The US Employment Effects of Military and Domestic Spending Priorities”) found that each $1 billion spent on defense would generate 8,555 jobs, not the 10,000 Professor Feldstein calculates. Given the problems just discussed with the F-22 and the new jobs it will not generate, even the lower University of Massachusetts estimate sounds extremely optimistic.

More importantly, the same amount of money spent elsewhere would generate more jobs, often better ones, and it would do it faster. For example, according to the study, $1 billion in spending for mass transit would generate 19,795 jobs (131 percent more than DOD), and education would generate 17,687 (107 percent more). The hiring can start in early 2009.

In fact, if employment is the aim, it makes more sense to cut defense spending and use the money in programs that do a better job at that. As for the defense budget, less money is what the doctor ordered. At extraordinarily high amounts of spending we have historically low levels of forces that are older and less ready to fight. The F-22 and F-35 typify the broken system that fostered this decline. Real reform would do much more for national security than giving the Pentagon more to spend poorly.

Like a Mirage in the Desert
Full withdrawal may recede into the time horizon
Charles Knight

Eight politically fruitful months ago, the lead New York Times editorial (July 7, 2008) gave favorable mention to the report of the Task Force for a Responsible Withdrawal from Iraq (http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/task-forceresponsiblewithdrawal.pdf) and to one other report addressing issues of withdrawal from Iraq. Calling for “a far more serious, public discussion by the two candidates” the Times said these reports “point the debate in the right direction.” Soon thereafter, as one of the principal authors of the Task Force report, I was invited to appear on a panel on “The Future of the US Military Presence in Iraq” at the US Institute of Peace.

Colin Kahl, co-author of the other report mentioned by the Times, was also on the panel. In his remarks Kahl made a strong play for the “reasonable” middle ground by claiming his was the Goldilocks position, as in “just right,” while co-panelist and Bush policy supporter Kimberly Kagan’s position was “too hot” and mine was “too cold.”

It turns out that in terms of the politics of Washington elites Kahl was just right: he has since gone into the Obama administration as DoD Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Middle East. I sensed the resurgence of the foreign policy centrists in that room last July where many in the overflow crowd held the view that, despite having just created a disaster in Iraq, the US should push ahead with the project of trying to run things according to its agenda in Iraq and the greater Middle East. Humility, even a measured realism that recognizes other national and human interests in the world, remains hard to find in DC.

I knew my co-panelists would prefer to focus their remarks on the tactical questions of what role the US military should have going forward in Iraq. I chose instead to make the bulk of my remarks on the strategic level – the level where the deepest and most consequential failures of American policy reside. The Obama administration appears to be largely following Colin Kahl’s recommendations and as yet has not faced into the strategic reform which is prerequisite to fully extracting our military from Iraq.

It is worth noting that the new administration is doing no less than four “strategic reviews” of the situation in Afghanistan, but again will be looking most closely at military tactics and strategy for defeating al Qaeda and the Taliban, while regional politics, Afghan politics and non-military issues remain relegated to supporting roles. If they can’t broaden their strategic review beyond Washington’s military-centric perspective they will be in Afghanistan for many decades to come.

I am sticking to my assessment that full withdrawal from Iraq will recede into the time horizon. Yes, I know the status of forces agreement (SOFA) stipulates a 2011 date. Keep in mind that SOFA are subject to renegotiation and that Thomas Ricks says the job is only half done (http://tinyurl.com/d74y6d).

This article was my presentation at the conference on July 25, 2008.

I am one of the organizers of the Task Force for a Responsible Withdrawal from Iraq, where we have published a set of 25 initiatives that complement and support a short timeline military withdrawal. They involve very considerable engagement, some of it extending years into the future. To get the troops out very soon and remain responsibly engaged in Iraq and the region, I would disengage from failed policies of the past, policies based on strategic error and that have led us into a strategic disaster.

Military occupation of Iraq is the central feature of this strategic error. With a new administration soon in the White House, it is time to “come to our senses, stop digging, and climb out of the hole.” No amount of clever adjustment at the tactical and operational levels will get us where we need to be. Only strategic change can get us on the road to recovery.

Three fundamental strategic errors have been made. First, we miscalculated what might be accomplished by force of arms; we failed to appreciate the limits on the utility of military power. Second, we failed to appreciate the power and dynamics of identity politics – and the likely reaction to foreign occupation. Third, we failed to take seriously the importance of international cooperation and legitimacy in the eyes of the world.

The price we and others are paying for these blunders is not measured in blood and treasure alone, although these costs are already terribly high. One example of these extraordinary costs that we have addressed in the Task Force report: there are now millions of refugees and millions of internally displaced persons, totaling nearly 15% of the Iraq population. The displacement of a proportional number of Americans would mean: 45 million forced from their homes, the equivalent of emptying out the population of America’s ten largest cities. This happened under the American watch in Iraq. It is an immense failure for an occupying power; one we still respond to in the most “care less” of ways.

In addition we have:
- weakened and misdirected our security assets – since 2004, the Army has been at an unsustainable up-tempo with accumulating harm to that service;
- severely damaged the reputation of the US, especially in the Muslim world;
- damaged US alliances;
- created a catalyst for communal conflict and provided a recruiting gift to Iraqi extremists;
- provided a motivator for jihadism and for terrorist tactics worldwide;
- handed Iran strategic and economic benefits which accrue every day we keep our troops in Iraq;
- tarnished the meaning and the promise of democracy, and undermined our efforts to promote it.

A New Basis for US Policy and Engagement
Moving from the level of strategy to con-
Like a Mirage in the Desert
Full withdrawal may recede into the time horizon (continued)

sider US operational policy in Iraq, it becomes clear that we must proceed on an entirely new basis, one that puts the Iraqis at the center and that gathers the international community to our side as equal partners in supporting reconciliation and recovery for this traumatized society.

The “new basis” necessarily begins with setting a credible, meaning short, timeline for withdrawal. This, because:
• Withdrawal is essential to drawing the remaining “rejectionists,” Sunni and Shia alike, into the political process;
• Withdrawal is essential to further reducing the appeal of al Qaeda in Mesopotamia;
• Withdrawal is essential to restoring the credibility of the Iraqi government as sovereign and as a leader of an inclusion and reconciliation process, and;
• Withdrawal is essential to unblocking international cooperation, especially that of key contact states, who can do more to help stabilize Iraq.

Only some of the benefits of setting a credible withdrawal timeline will materialize simply by announcing the withdrawal. In addition it will take effective diplomacy and considerable resources, before and after, to draw the rejectionists in and catalyze international cooperation and support. This is much of what we have specified in the Task Force Report.

A New Realism
The “new basis” of policy implies a new realism about what we can hope to accomplish in Iraq and how. It means finally coming to terms with a number of uncomfortable facts:
• American military presence and action has been part of the problem. It is an affront to Iraqi national and communal identities, and a stimulant to rejectionism and insurgency and violence.
• From the start, we have been handicapped by being an alien power. It means we are judged by a different standard. And it tars everyone who works with us; it makes suspect every process we presume to lead.
• Our “moral authority,” our ability to truly win “hearts and minds” in sufficient numbers, has been undercut by too much firepower and too many house raids, checkpoint killings, road rams, jailings, and abuses of power. (Yes, others have done much worse, but that doesn’t matter. As I said: we are judged differently because we are alien to Iraqi culture.)
• Our authority is also undercut because we wear our privilege and self-interest on our sleeves. It’s evident in our insistence of immunity for our nationals and in the details of basing agreements and oil deals we try to cut.

So we shouldn’t be surprised, when opinion polls find that very few Iraqis think the US is doing a good job in their country. Nor should we be surprised when focus groups conducted for our military command find, as the Washington Post reports, that “Iraqis of all sectarian and ethnic groups believe that the US military invasion is the primary root of the violent differences among them, and see the departure of ‘occupying forces’ as the key to national reconciliation.” Sentiments like these contribute to Maliki’s push back on basing agreements and to his support of a withdrawal timeline.

A final element of requisite realism has to do with the goal of producing a reliably stable, secure, well-governed, and prosperous Iraq. This is the work of decades, not years. It is principally a political job. And it is principally the job of Iraqis, although they will need substantial international support. What sort of international support, is the question. Support dominated by the US will continue to get in the way of progress. So, any strategy that involves staying militarily is at odds with putative US goals for Iraqi society.

Beyond the surge
The surge has brought down the level of violence, right? Yes... and today the level of violence is comparable, proportionately, to the worst years of the “troubles” in Northern Ireland. It is a very good thing that fewer are dying in Iraq, but that improvement alone is far from sufficient evidence from which to conclude that our policy is now on the right track.

How did the reduction in violence come about? Not principally by the application of increased US military power or by adopting new counter-insurgency doctrine, but by accommodating and supporting the desire of Sunnis for local control and by “coming to terms” with Moqtada al-Sadr and by his decision, encouraged by Iran, to stand-down his armed contest with the Badr brigades.

As we assess the so-called “surge strategy,” it is important to note its limits:
• The surge has reduced violence by leveraging and reinforcing the inter-communal and intra-communal divisions that plague Iraq; think of the walls American soldiers have built to separate Sunni and Shia enclaves in Baghdad.
• The fact remains that none of the powerful Iraqi groups or leaders with whom we are currently allied share the American vision or purpose, not even the Kurds. Our alliances are marriages of convenience, and shaky ones at that.

Indeed, the surge marks the limit of what the United States might accomplish in Iraq by military means. Now we need to bring into the political process most of the remaining rejectionists and to catalyze the type of international support that will facilitate this inclusion and a national accord. And this requires US military withdrawal.

Some proponents of staying warn us about backsliding if the US leaves, including the specter of a failed state wherein al Qaeda will thrive. Firstly, this warning displays a basic misunderstanding of al Qaeda, which was founded as a reaction to the US invasion; when the US leaves Iraq, al Qaeda loses the pri-
Like a Mirage in the Desert
Full withdrawal may recede into the time horizon

Many motivation for it members. Rather than thrive, it is very likely to fade. Secondly, political instability does not equal a failed state; there are many ways of avoiding that outcome that do not involve keeping our troops there indefinitely. Iraq is a traumatized society and that condition is a major contributing factor to why Iraq will be politically volatile for a long time to come. But seeking to shape or control Iraqi politics with Army brigades is to perpetuate the use of a blunt and inappropriate tool that does at least as much harm as it does good. Staying means staying for a very long time! Our presence is one cause of the violence; we will always be seen as a foreign invader to be resisted.

We must get over the notion that stabilizing Iraq is something for the US to do, that it is something we can do. Stability is fundamentally something for Iraqis themselves to achieve. Since US intervention is a contributing factor to Iraqi national problems, effective outside help will have to move through international agency, not bilateral arrangements or narrow multi-lateral arrangements dominated by Western nations.

Looking at the details of the proposals for “getting out as soon as conditions allow,” such as Colin Kahl’s, I find structures of dependency that have no end point. For instance, the CNAS report suggested that the US will need to manage the Sons of Iraq formations we have been supporting by “preventing them from acquiring heavy weapons, tightly restricting their jurisdictions and movement, and closely monitoring them for compliance so that they do not rub up against rival militias.” That strikes me as a level of control over native forces typical of a colonial power, not a reasonable mission for an army that is planning to leave anytime soon. Embrace that sort of mission and you will be there for a very long time.

If it is strategically important to leave, we must understand that it is an illusion to think we’ll just linger a while longer to fix things up in Iraq before we leave. As long as the US stays in Iraq the goal of national reconciliation will recede into the time horizon like a mirage in the desert.

What of the important measures to complement withdrawal?
The US should call for the establishment, as part of the existing International Compact with Iraq, of an International Support Group comprising the five permanent Security Council members, Iraq’s six neighbors, and a representative of the UN Secretary General. Within this Support Group the US should seek an agreement on a code of conduct for international relations with Iraq, emphasizing the principle of non-interference, an agreement on common goals and compromises required for the stabilization of Iraq, and collaborative support for a reinvigorated Iraqi inclusion and reconciliation process.

As vital background to this, the US must re-engage Syria and Iran in non-coercive “give-and-take” diplomacy addressing bilateral issues. Proceeding on the basis of mutual respect, this diplomacy should have a wide-ranging scope, thereby affording the United States maximum leverage in talks about the mutual benefits of principled non-interference in Iraq. Talks of this scope would also need to address what else Syria and Iran could do, beyond pledging non-interference in Iraq, to calm regional tensions. Obviously, there is no basis for these discussions unless the US is ready to pledge and demonstrate non-interference as well. That requires a short timeline for withdrawal.

Key provisions of the Report of the Task Force for a Responsible Withdrawal from Iraq

• Announce short timeline for withdrawal and use as leverage to pull rejectionists into the political process of national accord; the withdrawal timeline to be embedded in a new UN Mandate negotiated in 2009.

• Pursue a national reconciliation process under UN auspices and with participation of relevant regional bodies.

• Build a new regional body of contact states, the International Support Group, to achieve real cooperation.

• Assist Iraqis and the UN in convening a pan-Iraqi conference on reconciliation, backed by an expanded writ for a UN mission in Iraq.

• Enhance legitimacy of stabilization and reconstruction efforts by placing under UN auspices with a powerful consortium of states in support, with the US to provide substantial financial support. UN is the political executive of effort, and also coordinates and oversees.

• Immediately re-engage Syria and Iran in non-coercive “give-and-take” diplomacy addressing bilateral issues.

• Engage with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey seeking their support for peace and economic recovery efforts in Iraq.

• Ramp up economic and humanitarian assistance, including a jobs program that will employ at least a half million people.

Notes


Charles Knight is Co-director of the Project on Defense Alternatives at the Commonwealth Institute and co-author of Quickly, Carefully, and Generously: The Necessary Steps for a Responsible Withdrawal from Iraq.
Lessons Learned for Afghanistan

Rep. Neil Abercrombie

Afghanistan has been called “the right war;” “a war we can win;” “the war we should have been fighting all along.” This should set off loud alarms because it suggests that military victory in Afghanistan will be nearly automatic if we just show up with enough troops. And, once again, some of our top military and political leaders are planning ahead for the last war; in this case, they’re trying to duplicate the so-called victory in Iraq.

Any notions of certainty are both frightening and naive. Frightening, because they’re founded in the belief that all we have to do is disengage our combat brigades from Iraq and redeploy them to Afghanistan to re-create the success we achieved eight years ago against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Naive, because they’re based on the recurring fantasy that 30,000 more US troops will transform Afghanistan into an ersatz version of a Muslim democracy. Like Iraq.

Of course, Iraq today — despite claims from neocons and Clinton-Bush-era nation builders — is hardly stable, harmonious or peaceful, except when compared with the sectarian nightmare of Iraq from 2005 to 2007. However, even then, Iraq wasn’t Afghanistan; not even close. To begin with, Afghanistan is a honeycomb of ethnic groups and tribes. About half its people are Pashtuns, from more than 30 different tribes; an additional 25 percent are Tajiks; 18 percent, Hazaras; 6 percent, Uzbeks; 3 percent, Turkmen; 1 percent, Qizilbash; and about 7 percent are Aimaq, Arab, Kirghiz, Wakhi, Farsiwan, Nuristani, Baluch, Brahui, Qizilbash, Kabuli or Jat. The country has been described by journalist Tom Coghlan as “one of the most conservative, opaque and dizzyingly complex tribal societies on earth.”

Second, President Hamid Karzai’s “national” government has little to do with the lives of Afghans outside Kabul and isn’t even recognized in every sector of that city. Classic counterinsurgency doctrine depends on an indigenous government we can support, but the current national government in Afghanistan doesn’t remotely qualify, unless one considers “worthy” a corrupt government bordering on a kleptocracy, with little real power over 90 percent of the country.

Third, our military presence is a double-edged sword. No country likes to be occupied, patrolled or garrisoned by a foreign military. Our own Founders didn’t take very well to it 233 years ago. The presence of US troops in Afghanistan to suppress violence and promote peace is often the match that ignites the violence and resistance in the first place. Afghans have always opposed the presence of large numbers of armed outsiders, and our troops, no matter how well intentioned, will be viewed the same way that Macedonian, British and Soviet troops were viewed in the past.

Before the United States commits its already stretched and weary forces, financial resources and battered reputation to another colossal geopolitical blunder, Congress and the Obama administration need to begin at the beginning and take the time to absorb a little history and contemporary culture of Afghanistan. Against a backdrop of knowledge, we need to ask and answer some very practical questions about our expectations there, including:

• What can we realistically achieve? What kind of Afghanistan do we want to leave behind?
• Must it be a working democracy with freely elected officials and a centralized government?
• Would it be sufficient to leave a region able to deny terrorists safe haven?
• What agreements with Pakistan will be necessary to curb or end the ability of Al Qaeda to commute to work from Pakistan?

• What will our relationship be with the Taliban?
• What will that require? How many troops and other military resources, at what cost and for how long?

Thoughtful and careful consideration of circumstances, goals and alternatives before committing to a course of action was supposed to be one of the hard lessons we learned in Vietnam more than 40 years ago and, again, in Iraq six years ago. Absent a clear and achievable objective and a realistic assessment of the cost to achieve the objective, the United States should not commit a single additional soldier, sailor, airman or Marine to Afghanistan.

So what is a “clear and achievable objective”? A starting point would be to simply ensure that Afghanistan is not a terrorist safe haven for groups with the ability to attack the United States. In other words, Afghanistan would become a counterterrorism, rather than counterinsurgency, operation.

Pursuit of this limited goal does not mean walking away from Afghanistan or abandoning its people. The United States could still provide substantial financial, logistic, intelligence and other support to an Afghan government and security forces. It would, however, be a critical step toward a realistic approach to American goals in Afghanistan and a step away from a fanciful and messianic vision of “fixing” a nation that is simply not fixable by outsiders.

Congressman Neil Abercrombie (D-Hawaii) is a senior Member of the US House of Representatives. He is Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces. He also serves as a member of the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee, overseeing the Department of the Navy, including the United States Marine Corps. This article was originally published February 9, 2009 on politico.com.

EPS is pleased to welcome Prof. Amita Batra, Associate Professor in the School of International Studies at J. Nehru University (JNU), as the new head of EPS-India. She will be working with EPS Fellow Manas Chatterji to organize a conference in January 2010 in New Delhi. We look forward to working with her to build a stronger, more active presence in India.
World Opinion and US Military Power

Is the US military presence in the Mideast a stabilizing force or does it provoke more conflict than it prevents?*

- 68.4% Provokes more conflict
- 16.6% Stabilizing force

What is the effect of the Iraq war on incidence of terrorism?**

- 59.4% Increases attacks
- 12.2% Decreases attacks

Is the US playing the role of world policeman more than it should?***

- 66.9% More than it should
- 23.7% Not more than it should

*Average of poll responses from 14 nations, April 2007
Source: Chicago Council on Global Affairs and WorldPublicOpinion.org

**Average of poll responses from 33 nations, February 2006
Source: BBC World Service, GlobeScan, and Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland

***Average of poll responses from 24 nations, January 2007
Source: BBC World Service, GlobeScan, and Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland

All three survey questions include polls from Argentina, Australia, China, France, India, Indonesia, Philippines, Russia, and South Korea. In addition to the core, the first question includes polls from Armenia, Israel, Palestine, Peru, and Ukraine. In addition to the core, the second question includes polls from Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Kenya, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Portugal, Turkey, and the UAE. The third adds to the core: Afghanistan, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Congo, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Great Britain, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Turkey.
**Upcoming Events**

**April 9 – 10, 2009.** The 2009 Global Nonviolence International Conference, hosted by the Mahatma Gandhi Center for Global Nonviolence at James Madison University, Harrisonburg, Virginia. Call for papers and more information at http://internationalpeaceandconflict.ning.com/forum/topics/call-for-papers-2009-global.

**May 7 – 8, 2009.** 10 Years of the Euro: Adjustment in Capital and Labor Markets conference sponsored by the Economic Policies Research Unit of the University of Minho, Braga, Portugal. For updates and more information, visit http://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/euro10years.

**June 24 – 26, 2009.** The 13th Annual International Conference on Economics and Security will take place at CITY College in Thessaloniki, Greece, sponsored by EPS-UK; EPS-Greece; the Business Administration and Economics Department, CITY College, an affiliated institution of the University of Sheffield; the University of the West of England; and SEERC (South East European Research Centre). The conference will have plenary sessions with keynote speakers, plus specialist workshop streams. http://www.city.academic.gr/special/events/economics_and_security09/index.html.


**June 29 – July 1, 2009.** Jan Tinbergen European Peace Science Conference in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Fee is 50 Euros. Email: EPSconference@gmail.com for more information.

**July 10 – 12, 2009.** New Directions for International Relations, a conference at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at IDC-Herzliya, Israel. Topics include: Behavioral Approaches to International Relations; Rational Choice and International Relations; Quantitative and Formal Analysis of Conflict and Conflict Resolution; Negotiations and Mediation in International Conflicts; Methodological Innovations in IR; and a special panel on Conflict Resolution in the Middle East: Bridging the Gap between Academia and Practice.