Robert S. McNamara

[N]uclear weapons — if they continue to exist — will eventually be used by accident or foolish design, and nuclear weapons are devastating in their destructive capacity beyond human imagination.

Robert McNamara

Richard Parker

I talked with Robert McNamara just once, at a London dinner party in 1992. I’d flown over to give a talk to a little group of former heads of state called the InterAction Council. So had McNamara, which I hadn’t known before I arrived.

At the dinner party, I’d just seated myself when someone suddenly yanked back the chair to my left and thrust out his hand. It took me a nanosecond to recognize him – and not thanks to the trademark steel-rimmed glasses and slicked-back hair. It was the energy my dinner companion radiated – he almost literally pulsed with energy. “McNamara. BOB McNamara,” he said, before dropping himself onto the chair; the words seemed to burst toward me. Pumping my hand, he had at 76 the grip and vigor of a college football player. We talked nonstop for the next three hours.

When McNamara finally died last month, at 93, I wondered whether journalists and commentators might finally be ready to look more deeply into who he was. I shouldn’t have. They weren’t.

And because allusion to David Halberstam’s by-now dead “best and brightest” trope was de rigueur, the tone to all the pieces seemed perfectly uniform, rooted in a combination of McNamara’s by-now potted personal attributes, dipped in a concoction of varying blends of melancholy, anger, confusion and, among the more literary, faux existentialism.

Just two points dominated, however: the question whether he’d said he was sorry for what he’d done in Vietnam – and whether he meant it, really meant it. Neither, for me, gets at the meaning of McNamara.

To understand his meaning, you have to realize that at some point Robert McNamara ceased being McNamara – to himself, to me, to all of us. He became, not to put too fine a point on it, a Greek eikon, a figurative representation which has, at least in religious terms, a status and power all its own as an object of veneration that somehow (often mysteriously) leads us to connect with the deeper ground truth beneath the image.

It wasn’t, however, the Vietnam War that made Bob McNamara ceased being McNamara – to himself, to me, to all of us. He became, not to put too fine a point on it, a Greek eikon, a figurative representation which has, at least in religious terms, a status and power all its own as an object of veneration that somehow (often mysteriously) leads us to connect with the deeper ground truth beneath the image.

It wasn’t, however, the Vietnam War that made Bob McNamara who he was, in our minds or in his; Vietnam in effect merely publicized what was already iconic in him, made it better known. It was World War II – the one we nowadays call “the good war,” fought by America’s eponymous “greatest generation” – that ultimately vested meaning in McNamara, iconic meaning and purpose whose living out led inevitably McNamara and us to Vietnam, and the darkness that haunted him thereafter unto death.

Continued on page 7
From the Crucible of Experience

Jonathan Granoff

Since the July 6 passing of Robert S. McNamara, torrents of articles have been written by those who remember him scathingly as the architect of the Vietnam War, and the years of failed policies resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths. They dismiss his many admissions of guilt and remorse and, consequently, his invaluable later work as one of the most effective advocates for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, arguably the most important issue we face today.

As President of the Global Security Institute, I had worked for years with this extraordinary man whose career engaged him as President of the Ford Motor Company and later the World Bank and US Secretary of Defense. His commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons was informed by knowing all too well several important truths: humans are fallible; civilization was saved by “good luck” in the Cuban Missile crisis; nuclear weapons - if they continue to exist - will eventually be used by accident or foolish design; and nuclear weapons are devastating in their destructive capacity beyond human imagination.

I am grateful to have had the privilege of working with him and becoming his friend. Perhaps the most profound lesson I learned from him was that a person can continue to learn and grow at any age.

One evening around midnight I received a call from him. He inquired whether it was okay to use a footnote from a law review article I had written in his analysis of the need for moral compass points in international policies. This was to be a major theme in his book Wilson’s Ghost and a critical point he had learned in the crucible of experience. As we discussed the universality of the Golden Rule, I realized that he was investigating this profound moral pillar with the intensity and openness of a youthful student. Moreover, he evaluated his own conduct and that of our nation in relation to it.

He wrote that book to address two questions: “Why, in essence, did 160 million people die in violent conflict in the 20th Century? What must be done to prevent the 21st Century from becoming as lethal as – or worse than – the 20th?”

I strongly recommend this book to anyone serious about world peace and security.

His forceful opposition to nuclear weapons, perhaps most eloquently stated in his 2005 Foreign Policy article, constituted one of the most effective calls for nuclear abolition. Long before the groundbreaking Wall Street Journal op/eds (January 15, 2008 and January 4, 2007) by Schultz, Nunn, Kissinger and Perry, Robert McNamara demonstrated that even the most visible cold warrior can understand that nuclear weapons in the 21st Century pose more of a problem than any problem they seek to solve, and that to favor nuclear abolition is to be neither naive nor anti-American.

Beyond our shared work on nuclear disarmament, Mr. McNamara and I collaborated on other issues as well. Our work together to promote the International Criminal Court, for example, in part resulted in his influential New York Times op/ed co-authored with Benjamin Ferencz.

While he was Secretary of Defense, to me he represented the failed policies that led to so much unnecessary suffering in the war in Vietnam. As a youth I carried so much venom for him. As I came to know what a good and caring man he was, I realized how foolish and arrogant I had been to judge his person thusly and how much good he actually had done in his life. One could make a good argument that during the Cuban Missile Crisis he was instrumental in saving civilization. But more importantly I came to realize that a person with sincerity can learn and grow. I also learned from working with him while he was in his eighties how fully committed he was to making the world a safer place and how willing he was to expend his time, his energy, his very health in this endeavor.

In the Epilogue of Wilson’s Ghost, he expressed his affection for an Archibald MacLeish poem “The Young Dead Soldiers:”

They say: Our deaths are not ours; they are yours; they will mean what you make them.

They say: Whether our lives and our deaths were for peace and a new hope or for nothing we cannot say; it is you who must say this.

They say: We leave you our deaths. Give them their meaning…

One should not be sad about a person passing at 93 but we will surely miss him.

He helped amplify the Global Security Institute’s advocacy for nuclear disarmament countless times. We remain grateful to have walked with him. May God bless his soul with infinite peace.

Sources


Jonathan Granoff is an author, attorney, and peace activist. He is president of the Global Security Institute and serves as Vice President of the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace, and Security at the UN.
Letter from the Director

One of my favorite quotes is from Walt Whitman, “Do I contradict myself? Very well I contradict myself. I am large. I contain multitudes.” It reminds me that humans are complex and multilayered, that even if a person presents one aspect I find challenging, perhaps there is another that I can connect with. I enjoy that complexity.

After the death of Robert McNamara last spring I read the articles and obituaries, many of which focused on his role as “the architect of Vietnam.” I found them a one-sided dismissal of his transforming the World Bank to focus on poverty reduction, of his passionate nuclear disarmament work which led to his becoming a trustee of this organization. We decided to ask a few of our members to reflect on McNamara, to explore various aspects of his life and legacy.

*The Economist*’s obituary observes, “Quantification was a word Robert McNamara loved. Numbers could express almost any human activity... Things you could count, he said, you ought to count.” Several of the articles I read mentioned his methodical mind, his technocratic managerial style. He is famous for instituting systems analysis as a basis for making key decisions on force requirements at the Pentagon: ‘systems’ indicates that every decision should be considered in as broad a context as necessary; ‘analysis’ emphasizes the need to reduce a complex problem to its component parts for better understanding. Systems analysis takes a complex problem and sorts out the tangle of significant factors so that each can be studied by the method most appropriate to it.

The science of economics has been described to me the same way - breaking down the complexities until each element can be studied. Most of the articles I read after McNamara’s death blamed the debacle in Vietnam on this focus on this decision to reduce every problem to numbers; as Richard Parker puts it in his piece in this issue, using “prodigious calculating skills to optimize... killing effects.”

A few years ago the November 2005 issue of *EPS Quarterly* explored “Modern Warfare.” Generals and war-planners have always argued that their new plan/technology/management style was going to save lives by being more efficient. *The Economist* and others seem to argue that McNamara was an advocate of this type of thinking: if we can just pin it down, then we can get in and get out quickly, and as few people as possible will get hurt. But the truth is that things are always more complex than our models can incorporate. Human relations are messy. *The Economist* obit concludes, “He was haunted by the thought that amid all the objective-setting and evaluating, the careful counting and the cost-benefit analysis, stood ordinary human beings. They behaved unpredictably.”

I am too young to remember the Vietnam era first hand, so I leave it to Richard Parker and James Galbraith to analyze elsewhere in this issue McNamara’s possible mistakes and regrets. What I do know for certain is that he spent the last 15-20 years of his life tirelessly and energetically campaigning for nuclear disarmament.

At the EPS dinner in his honor, he told of meeting some of the surviving key personnel from the Cuban Missile Crisis. For the first time he had the opportunity to meet with some of his counterparts from Russia and Cuba and discuss what had been in their minds during those days. He realized just how close we had come to nuclear war. In 2005 McNamara pursued this theme in his article *Apocalypse Soon*. He wrote, “In conventional war, mistakes cost lives, sometimes thousands of lives. However, if mistakes were to affect decisions relating to the use of nuclear forces, there would be no learning curve. They would result in the destruction of nations. The indefinite combination of human fallibility and nuclear weapons carries a very high risk.”

Robert McNamara began his career as an economics professor at Harvard and ended it as a vigorous peace and disarmament activist. As such, he was an admirable trustee for our organization. I do not seek to erase or excuse the mistakes of the Vietnam War. After all, I have spent the past 8 years fighting against two wars that I find horribly mistaken and tragically destructive. I think we might, however, use the life of Robert McNamara as a cautionary tale – reminding us that there are always joys and sorrows behind the numbers, and of the tremendous potential we humans have for error, growth, and change.

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Robert McNamara and Economists, Peace, and Security

James K. Galbraith

How exactly Robert McNamara became a Trustee of Economists Allied for Arms Reduction (as it then was) is lost to history. But at least one of his connections to our group is known. In the foreword to his memoir In Retrospect, McNamara states that the recommendation to President-elect Kennedy that he be made Secretary of Defense came from my father, John Kenneth Galbraith – who became, thirty years later, a founder of ECAAR.

I had never met McNamara when he came to Austin on May 1, 1995, to speak at the University of Texas. But I had been working, on and off, for three years on the question of Kennedy's plans for Vietnam. My interest had been piqued by John Newman's remarkable 1992 JFK and Vietnam, which alleged that Kennedy had decided, in October, 1963, to order a withdrawal of all US advisory forces from Vietnam, beginning immediately and finishing by the end of 1965. I was aware, too, that McNamara had given Newman the transcript of his oral history, taped in 1986 and otherwise closed, confirming that this was so.

Thus, I knew that McNamara's memoir would have to deal with the subject. And so, on the afternoon of his visit, I located the one copy so far arrived in Austin, bought it, and found the relevant passage — the account of Kennedy's Vietnam withdrawal decision meetings, given in great detail. There was a cryptic footnote: “JFKLPR.” What could that mean, if not “John F. Kennedy Library Presidential Recordings?”

Armed with this thought, and knowing that the LBJ Library's questioning procedures involved submitting hand-written queries on half-page forms, I printed my question in large computer type on a full sheet of paper. This worked like a charm. My friend the local anchorman, Neal Spelce, must have thought, at first, that my question was a plant from the chair. So he read it out – and McNamara responded with the utmost clarity. There were tapes.

The column I then wrote for the Texas Observer had an interesting career. Someone – I suspect Arthur Schlesinger – sent it on to McNamara. A few months later, I received a form letter from Viking Press, requesting permission to reprint it. It was a seemingly routine request, but one thing caught my eye: the estimate of 150,000 copies. And then I noticed the name of the requestor: Robert Strange McNamara. The column appears in the appendix to the In Retrospect's paperback edition.

Only later did I learn the full role my father had played in Kennedy's decision. In fact the plan to withdraw all US forces from Vietnam originated with my father's September 1961 trip to Saigon. It was taken up by Kennedy in 1962, and McNamara was tasked with bringing it to the point of decision. This he accomplished by October, 1963. Only later did I meet McNamara, at our house in Vermont, in the company of Katharine Graham and Tom Winship (of the Boston Globe) – and we were able to discuss these issues in minute detail. Only later did I join EPS, and found in McNamara a steady supporter of this organization.

The larger story of the withdrawal plan I have told elsewhere, mainly in the Boston Review and in Salon. It has been the subject of a confirming exchange in late 2007 with Francis Bator, Deputy National Security Adviser under Johnson, in The New York Review of Books. Most comprehensively, there was the conference at Musgrove Island in April, 2005 involving a battery of historians and living participants in these events, now magnificently summarized by James G. Blight, Janet Lang and David Welch in their book Vietnam: If Kennedy Had Lived (Roman and Littlefield, 2009).

Robert McNamara, in what may have been his last published comment, had this to say of this book: "I urge everyone interested in Kennedy, Johnson and Vietnam, and everyone concerned about the kind of leadership we need to keep our nation out of war, to read this book. I recommend it not because the authors agree with my own conclusion – though in the end, they too feel JFK probably would have avoided a major war in Vietnam. I recommend it because it is far and away the best book on these subjects I have ever read – lucid, rich and balanced, with all sides getting a fair, but critical hearing."

The long argument over JFK and Vietnam is, or ought to be, over.

The other question on which I engaged McNamara on that day in Vermont was that of nuclear war. He didn't need to say much. I had already worked out, and published in The American Prospect, the fact that the American war-fighting plan, as presented to Kennedy and to McNamara in July 1961, was a plan for an unprovoked first strike — for a preventive war. I knew that the key to McNamara's tenure at Defense, including much of the conduct of the war in Vietnam, had been the necessity to block any circumstance that might force the President toward such an outcome.

I knew that we were not fully safe from this possibility until around 1967, for only then did the Soviet Union actually acquire a deterrent force, making a first-strike plan militarily unviable. I did not know, until Daniel Ellsberg revealed it plainly in Secrets, that Kennedy and Johnson had adopted a flat no-first-use policy, in violation of stated NATO doctrine. I also did not know – McNamara himself did not yet know — that McNamara's restraint over Cuba in October, 1962 had prevented a battle between invading American forces and Soviet defenders armed with atomic torpedoes.
Robert McNamara and Economists, Peace, and Security

It was for nuclear reasons, mainly, that ECAAR’s Board agreed to honor Robert McNamara at our annual dinner in 2003. My role was to make a brief introduction. I told McNamara that while I was not among the marchers who circled the Pentagon in 1965, I might have been. Still, I had learned some things since. I’d learned about the nuclear balance, or lack thereof, between the United States and the Soviet Union. I suggested that one reason we were alive, and able to enjoy dinner on that occasion in the beautiful and historic city of Washington DC, was the dark struggle carried out, for us all, by President Kennedy, by President Johnson, and by Bob McNamara in those years.

McNamara’s War of Words
James K. Galbraith

Not many of the thousand people who crowded to hear Robert McNamara at the LBJ Library in Austin on May 1 [1995] could have yet read his book. None, of course, had missed the torrent of invective that accompanied its publication.

McNamara’s assailants came from all sides. Spokesmen for veterans reproached him for suggesting, though he does no such thing, that their sacrifices were “in vain.” The New York Times trotted out that old catch-phrase “the best and the brightest,” and recast itself as the voice of the sixties war critics, though it was no such thing. Left sharpshooters treated that spectacle with contempt; “War Criminal says Sorry, Sobs” was the headline on Alex Cockburn’s Times-bashing column in The Nation. Among McNamara’s few defenders, the CIA veteran and whistleblower John Stockwell wondered whether this might be the last time a senior policymaker admits to error on such a subject.

At the Library, McNamara said little until it came to questions. The second question, sent up from the audience and read by local TV newscaster Neal Spelce, concerned the “Fateful Fall of 1963.” If Kennedy intended, as McNamara and many others have written, eventually to withdraw the combat advisers then in Vietnam, why did the withdrawal not occur?

A reasonable question, which McNamara did not answer. Instead, he went, like a match-touched fuse, straight to an explosive historical issue. This was the National Security Council meeting of October 2, 1963 at which, McNamara told the audience, President Kennedy decided three things. They were (1) a complete withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam "by December 31, 1965;" (2) a first-phase withdrawal of 1,000 troops "by the end of 1963;" and (3) a public announcement, to put the decision "in concrete."

If Kennedy intended, as McNamara and many others have written, eventually to withdraw the combat advisers then in Vietnam, why did the withdrawal not occur?

How did McNamara know (or confirm his memory) that Kennedy had "decided" these things? Answer: there is a tape of this meeting, recorded on Kennedy’s White House tapping system, “just like Nixon's,” McNamara said. The tape resides in the Kennedy Presidential Library at Boston. It is evidently accessible only through the Kennedy family, which granted access to McNamara and to his coauthor Brian Vandemark.

Why is this issue explosive? Because with only two obscure exceptions none of the dozens of books on the history of Vietnam decision-making over the past thirty years has winkled out the story of Kennedy’s decision to withdraw. It is not in David Halberstam’s The Best and the Brightest, not in Stanley Karnow’s Vietnam, not in Richard Reeves’ President Kennedy, not in any of the scholarly volumes.

All of the established sources maintain instead that Johnson’s policy was a smooth continuation of JFK’s, and that escalation did not happen until the Tonkin Gulf incident of August, 1964. One exception, Peter Dale Scott’s 1972 The War Conspiracy, disappeared long ago. The other, John M. Newman’s JFK and Vietnam (Warner Books, 1992) was withdrawn from print by its publisher in 1993 despite having been reviewed favorably on the front page of The New York Times Book Review, and is for the moment available only in libraries and from the remainder house Crown Outlet.

Now comes McNamara, with confirmation of Newman’s argument and the flat statement that there exists a tape as proof. McNamara’s book spells out the story of the October 2 meeting. He omits mention of the subsequent meeting of October 5, which formalized the October 2 decision, and of National Security Action Memorandum 263, issued on October 11 and available since 1971 in the “Gravel” edition of the Pentagon Papers, which codified it. Details of this chronology are, however, laid out carefully by Newman. It might be added that McNamara is on record as far back as July 1986 confirming Kennedy’s decision to withdraw, in an oral history closely held since then by the Kennedy Library. McNamara’s oral history also makes plain, though his book fudges the issue, that Kennedy’s decision was based

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McNamara’s War of Words
Continued from page 5

on McNamara’s own recommendation to withdraw in spite of the fact that the US was losing the war. So, to Spelce’s question: why did the withdrawal not occur? To this McNamara only said, "it’s in the book." And it is. Lyndon Johnson, in line with the military and intelligence chiefs, had other ideas. On November 24, 1963, he told Ambassador Cabot Lodge that his priority was to "win the war." On November 26, he signed NSAM 273, which (as McNamara also confirms) was the authorization for direct, US-controlled covert operations against North Vietnam, known as OPLAN 34A. The proposal for such operations was, as McNamara writes, "first raised [to the Cabinet] at the November 20, 1963 Honolulu conference" – a proposal for escalation at a moment when presidential policy was formally committed to phased withdrawal, and would be for another six days.¹

These issues, it must be stressed, are distinct from the question of what actually happened in Dallas on November 22, 1963 – that black hole of history. They are, for the moment, more a matter of the integrity of historical inquiry when issues of high policy, reputation, long-standing myth and deep suspicion are involved.

The question is whether professional historians will now correct the incomplete or in some cases flawed record left to us by themselves and (often as part of otherwise admirable books) by the journalists such as Halberstam, Kornow and Reeves.

And whether the government will now release all of the still-classified records surrounding Vietnam and other military decision-making, including nuclear policy in the fall of 1963, with all records of the Honolulu conference of November 20–21 and all tapes from the Kennedy and Johnson White Houses.

And whether the press – left, right and center – having vilified Robert McNamara almost to the point of discredit, will pause long enough to reconsider the deadly serious historical issues raised by his book before rushing off to the campaign or some other preoccupation.

Endnote
1. The veterans of those disastrous missions surfaced on the front page of the New York Times on April 14, 1995, when it was revealed that after 30 years in Vietnamese prisons many could not get US visas because records of their service apparently did not exist.

This article was originally published in the Texas Observer, 1995, and was reprinted, at McNamara’s request and with the author’s permission, in the paperback edition of In Retrospect. Last revised: June 4, 1995.

Why Join EPS?

EPS’s efforts depend heavily on the support of its members. By joining today, you unite with dedicated individuals committed to reducing dependence on military power, and to searching for political and institutional change through peaceful democratic processes.

Our members contribute not only financially, but also with research, articles, and as speakers at events. Your membership helps to ensure that reasoned perspectives on essential economic issues continue to be heard.

Member benefits
For those who desire monthly updates, we send our electronic newsletter, NewsNotes. Four times yearly, look for our print newsletter, the EPS Quarterly, featuring in-depth articles on the economics of peace, war and security. With these publications you’ll always have your finger on the pulse of EPS’s work and see how essential your support is to our success. Members also receive invitations to EPS events.

Most importantly, you join our global network of concerned academics, researchers, business leaders and people from all segments of society who believe that economists have something valuable to bring to the search for peace in our world.

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World War II was fought with a savagery on all sides that we today still can’t admit. The horrors of the Nazi death camps, Japanese death marches, Soviet killing fields we readily point to, because all stand for the darkness of others – but not our own.

When the Smithsonian several years ago tried to hint at that darkness in an exhibit on Hiroshima, the exhibit wasn’t allowed to open. When one raises the fire-bombing of Dresden or Tokyo, a silence fills the room – and a look of incomprehension.

But long before Hue or Hanoi, the Tet Offensive or Operation Phoenix, Bob McNamara had put his prodigious rationalism to work targeting millions of human beings for death. In The Fog of War, almost as an aside, he acknowledges what he’d done by imagining what would have happened had America had lost World War II. “Curtis Lemay and I,” he said, “would have been tried as war criminals.”

First over Europe, then over Japan, McNamara had used his prodigious calculating skills to optimize the killing effects of Air Force bombing of soldiers, factories, and civilians alike. Human lives became numbers, murder a form of numeracy.

America certainly had a prior history of violence with its Indians and slaves, but never on this scale, never with this fury, never so shearly mechanized. By 1945, no shred of innocence remained; we were ready to be the superpower we are still today.

Richard Parker is Lecturer in Public Policy and Senior Fellow of the Shorenstein Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. He has worked as an economist for the UNDP, as cofounder of Mother Jones Magazine, and as head of his own consulting firm. His books include John Kenneth Galbraith: His Life, His Politics, His Economics.
EPS at the AEA/ASSA Meetings

All EPS events at the AEA/ASSA (American Economics Association/Allied Social Sciences Associations) 2010 meetings will be held Monday, January 4 in the Hilton Atlanta

January 4, 8:00am, Hilton Atlanta, Grand Salon B
Session One: Global Financial Crises: Past, Present and Future
Chair: Allen Sinai
Michael Intriligator, UCLA and Milken Institute, “The Financial Crisis of 2007-09: Causes, Consequences, Lessons”
Simon Johnson, MIT, “Global Financial Crisis: Over, or Just Beginning?”
Allen Sinai, Decision Economics, Inc., “Financial Crises in Historical Context and Future Prospects”
Joseph Stiglitz, Columbia University, “What Went Wrong and What Can Go Right?”

January 4, 2:30pm, Hilton Atlanta, Room 201
Session Two: Planning and Designing a Sustainable Economic Future
Chair: Michael Intriligator
Andrew Brimmer, Brimmer & Co.
Woodrow W. Clark, Clark Strategic Partners, UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
Eban Goodstein, Bard Center for Environmental Policy
Clark Abt, Brandeis University

January 4, 6:30pm, Hilton Atlanta, Grand Ballroom B
EPS Dinner Honoring Andrew Brimmer
To register for the dinner, please email Thea Harvey: theaharvey@epsusa.org

A complete (preliminary) program of the conference is online at http://www.aeaweb.org/aea/conference/program/preliminary.php

Registration and housing are now open. Please book early to be sure of getting a hotel at the conference rates.

Registration form:
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/AEA/Annual_Meeting/pdfs/Registration_Form_2010.pdf

Housing information:
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/AEA/Annual_Meeting/pdfs/Housing_Instructions_2010.pdf